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ARTICLES
THE RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS:
AN OPTIMAL CONTRACT FRAMEWORK
ADAM

B. Coxt & ERIC A.

POSNERf

Why do migrants enjoy some of the rights associated with citizenship? Existing
accounts typically answer this question in terms of obligation-ofa duty on the part
of states to confer citizenship. Moreover, scholars tend to lump together the rights
conventionally associated with citizenship when they answer this question. In contrast, this Article disaggregatesthe rights associated with citizenship, asks what both
states and migrants want, and inquires into how the suite of rights associated with
citizenship might advance those interests. States want to encourage migrants to
enter their territoryand to make country-specific investments, but states also have
an interest in being able to remove migrants or make their lives less comfortable if
circumstances change. However, migrants will not enter and make country-specific
investments if the state can easily remove them or change the conditions in which
they live. Accordingly, the optimal "migration contract" between the state and the
migrant reflects the trade-offs between commitment and flexibility. We discuss ways
in which basic rights to liberty and property, political rights including voting, and
other rights may embody the optimal contract in different circumstances.
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INTRODUCTION

It is bedrock policy that citizens and noncitizens are to be treated
differently. Virtually no one believes that noncitizens should have the
right to vote or to run for office. Many noncitizens-including tourists, business people, and the spouses of certain visa holders-do not
even have the right to work or to change jobs. All noncitizens face the
risk of deportation if they commit certain crimes; citizens, by contrast,
can never be exiled. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the
constitutional rights of noncitizens are limited.1 Like the United
States, other countries draw a sharp line between citizens and noncitizens, and recognize that citizens have more rights than noncitizens
do.
If citizens and noncitizens may be treated differently, how differently may they be treated? Most scholars answer this normative question on the basis of doctrine or political theory. Doctrinal accounts
attempt to derive noncitizens' rights from constitutional and legal traditions. 2 Political theories derive noncitizens' rights from various the3
oretical conceptions of democracy and citizenship.
I See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976) ("The fact that all persons, aliens
and citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further
conclusion that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship .... "); see
also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-70 (1972) (recognizing Congress's longestablished ability to exclude aliens); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-32 (1954) (noting
Congress's ability to enact statutes deporting aliens).
2 See generally GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996) (exploring constitutional treatment of
immigrants historically in effort to resolve current controversies in immigration law).
3 See generally T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SovEREIGNTY: THE
CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2002); HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
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Largely overlooked, however, are equally important descriptive
questions: Why do governments, such as the U.S. government, grant
any rights to noncitizens at all? Why have the rights of noncitizens
improved over the years? And why do they still fall short of the rights
enjoyed by citizens? In other words, if we assume that policy toward
noncitizens reflects the interests of states, what policies would we predict states to have, and how do we explain variations across states and
across time?
On a naive view, for example, one might think that states would
give noncitizens no rights at all. Why give rights to people who do not
belong to one's political community? However, it is clear that states
give rights to noncitizens, particularly migrants, in part to give them
certain incentives: to enter the country, to work and pay taxes, and to
augment the population.
At the same time, the granting of rights to migrants constrains
states. Migration policies that serve the national interest during times
of peace and economic prosperity may quickly become unpopular
when those times change. States prefer flexibility ex post, so they can
change migration policy when circumstances change. But, if they
insist on such flexibility and hence grant minimal rights to migrants,
migrants will have weak incentives to enter the country in the first
place.
Migrants' rights vary along two dimensions. First, they differ in
their scope. In the United States, migrants are classified in many different ways, and each class enjoys a different bundle of rights. People
who enter the country illegally have certain basic rights-to life, to
property, to minimal process-but little more. People who enter
legally have more generous rights, but their rights are still more
limited than those of citizens. For example, tourists and the spouses
of certain migrants have basic rights to life, property, and criminal and
civil process, but they do not have the right to work for pay or to
remain in the country beyond the period of their visas. Migrants with
work visas have the right to work in certain positions but often no
right to change jobs.

AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE
UNITED STATES (2006); PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS:
ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP (1998); PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP:
AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION (2008); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF
JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and

Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. POL. 251 (1987); Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare and the Optimal Immigration Policy,
145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1997).
Reprinted with permission of New York University School of Law
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Lawful permanent residents have the right to work as well as the
other rights described above, but do not enjoy the right to vote. And
whereas citizens cannot be "removed" (exiled), lawful permanent
residents and other migrants can be removed (deported) for committing certain crimes, posing a security threat, and so forth. Lawful permanent residents are granted an additional important right: the right
to become citizens after they have resided in this country for five
years, passed a citizenship exam, and satisfied certain other conditions. Some migrants, therefore, but not others, are granted the right
4
to acquire full citizenship rights through naturalization.
Migrants' rights also vary along a second dimension: their
"strength," or, more precisely, the difficulty or ease with which the
government can change them. At one extreme, rights can be administrative: The executive branch has the sole discretion to determine the
rights of migrants and can change them at any time. Rights can also
be statutory: Congress determines and changes them. At the other
extreme, rights can be constitutional, in which case they may be
changed only by amendment or through judicial interpretation of the
Constitution. Migrants enjoy all three types of rights. For example,
the Constitution sets some basic minima for process rights, which stat5
utes and administrative regulations have elaborated on and extended.
This Article investigates variation in both the content and
strength of migrant rights. It also analyzes one type of right, the right
to vote, that cuts across these two categories. Voting rights (as well as
other rights of political participation) are important citizenship rights.
The holder of voting rights has the power to affect political outcomes
by influencing the selection of public officials. In one sense, voting
rights are an aspect of the content of migrant rights: Migrants who
can vote have rights that other migrants lack. In another sense, voting
rights also affect the strength of migrant rights, including the strength
of voting rights themselves. Although in theory Congress could eliminate a migrant's voting right by repealing the statute that created it,
doing so would be more difficult than repealing other types of migrant
rights because migrants would likely vote against politicians who
appeared inclined to repeal their voting rights.
In the United States, nonresident aliens and other migrants rarely
have voting rights, and when they do, they are at the municipal level
and are limited. 6 However, in the past, migrants were granted more
substantial voting rights at the state level, as we will discuss. 7 Even
4 See
5 See
6 See
7 See

infra Part L.A-B.
infra Part I.B.
infra note 38.
infra text accompanying notes 47-52.
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today, voting rights remain an important aspect of the incentive
system used to lure migrants to the United States: migrants are promised that if they qualify for citizenship and naturalize, they will have
the right to vote. 8 We can thus think of contingent, deferred voting
rights as an aspect of the bundle of migrant rights.
To explain the content and strength of migrant rights, we borrow
the optimal contract framework developed by economists to analyze
contractual behavior. 9 Although migrants do not enter into actual
contracts with the U.S. government, their relationship with the U.S.
government is analogous to a contractual relationship. Both sides
gain from an implicit deal. The migrant enters the United States,
invests in learning English and aspects of American culture, and
obtains a return in the form of higher wages, a share of public goods,
and other benefits. The U.S. government-which we use as a stand-in
for native citizens-gains in diverse ways: Increased tax revenues
help finance public goods, labor costs are reduced, and the migrant
contributes to cultural and social life.
In thinking about these issues, most people focus on the question
of how the government should select among migrants. The world
presents a large pool of potential immigrants, and states have to figure
out how to separate those immigrants it considers desirable from
those it does not. 10 The debate focuses on the desirability of certain
characteristics such as labor skills and familial relationships with
American citizens. But there is another problem of equal importance:
how the "migration contract" between the migrant and the U.S. government should be designed once a particular migrant is selected. The
main problem for the government is that a migrant who is highly
desirable at the time of migration might turn out to be undesirable at
a later time. All else equal, the government would like to retain the
option to remove any migrant any time events change such that the
benefits from the migrant's presence no longer exceed the costs.
However, the problem with such flexibility is that a migrant will
not enter a country, or will enter but decline to sink roots in that
country, if she knows that she can be removed at any time. Many
migrants do best by making what we will call "country-specific investments"-like learning the dominant language and developing social
networks-but a typically risk-averse migrant will not make such
8 See infra text accompanying notes 63-65, 118-27 (discussing conditions under which
voting rights are most likely to change migration incentives).
9 See generally PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CoNTRAcr THEORY
(2005) (providing introduction to economic modeling of contracts).
10 We focus on these screening issues in Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The SecondOrder Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2007).
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investments if she can be easily removed. Moreover, migrants may
worry that the government will wield its removal power opportunistically, trumping up security threats or exaggerating financial downturns in order to justify deportation.
Governments, too, often want migrants to make country-specific
investments, so it is in their interest to guarantee a migrant's right to
remain even if bad events occur-at least up to a point. It will therefore sometimes be in a nation's interest to tie its own hands so that it
cannot use its deportation power opportunistically. The optimal
migration contract balances the government's interest in flexibility
and the migrant's interest in tying the government's hands. It can do
so in two ways: by granting migrants more or less generous rights and
by making it harder or easier for the government to change those
rights.
Our approach helps expand the possibilities for legal design by
showing why different packages of rights might be conferred on different groups of migrants. Much existing scholarship suggests that
there is a relatively static, hierarchical relationship among various
migrants' rights.'1 On these accounts, rights increase in lock-step with
increasing "membership" in the Receiving State. Rights are also
arranged hierarchically, with rights like political participation almost
always associated with higher levels of membership than are rights
like occupational freedom. Our account abandons this idea of a
lexical relationship among various rights associated with citizenship.
We also abandon the prevalent assumption in the literature that
all migrants should be accorded the same rights. 12 Migrants come
with various goals: Some hope to come and work in a Receiving State
for a short time, others hope to remain for a long time but expect
eventually to return home, and others intend to remain permanently.
Each of these groups of migrants will value rights differently: For
some, the right to remain for a guaranteed period of time will be far
more important than occupational freedom, while others will have the
opposite preferences. As a result, our approach makes it possible to
11 There is some ambiguity in this literature about whether the hierarchy of rights is
intended as a descriptive account of existing practices or a normative account of what the
structure of migrants' rights should look like. Often the literature appears to make both
claims. See, e.g., ALEINIKOFF, supra note 3, at 172; JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 161-62 (1980) (describing and assuming appropriateness of hierarchical relationship between political rights and other rights for migrants); MOTOMURA, supra note 3, at
11-13 (discussing hierarchical relationship among types of rights); WALZER, supra note 3,
at 60 (assuming appropriateness of such hierarchical relationship during post-entry transition period).
12 See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 3, at 52-65 (rejecting differentiation between classes
of migrants).
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see why we should expect variation in the optimal migration contracts-variation that is hard to evaluate within the literature's
existing frameworks.
The rest of this Article unpacks our argument. Part I introduces
the relevant conceptual distinctions and provides a brief overview of
relevant aspects of American immigration law and its history. Part II
provides a simple theoretical account of the optimal migration contract between migrant and government. Part III addresses some realworld complications by relaxing the basic model's assumption that the
contract involves only two parties. Part IV discusses ways in which
the immigration policies of different countries interact.
This Article builds on the economic approach to immigration law
that we developed in an earlier article. 13 In this approach, the relationship between the Receiving State and the migrant is treated as
though it were a contractual relationship, which allows one to use
ideas from the optimal contract literature in economics. As in all contractual relationships, the two parties have partially overlapping interests. States gain by allowing migrants to enter, and migrants gain by
entering states. But each side of the transaction does better by
retaining flexibility unavailable to the other. The contracting problem
is to choose "terms"-that is, immigration laws-that maximize the
joint benefit.
The theme of this paper is that the optimal migration contract
between migrant and government-that is, the package of rights that
the migrant receives-is shaped by a central precommitment problem:
Governments seek to attract migrants with desirable skills and characteristics, but also want to maintain flexibility so that the migrants can
be expelled or otherwise regulated as changing circumstances develop.
However, if governments maintain flexibility, migrants will be reluctant to enter and invest in their relationship with the Receiving State.
The optimal migration contract depends on (and hence changes with)
a host of exogenous variables. Rights will be weaker, for example,
when governments expect that the risk of future adverse events is
high. They will be stronger when governments gain a net benefit as
migrants make country-specific investments. With an understanding
13 See generally Cox & Posner, supra note 10. As we explained in that paper, the economics literature focuses on first-order issues-the optimal number and types of migrants.
In this Article we evaluate second-order issues, that is, issues of the structure and design of
migration policy. For some related work in the law and economics literature, see Nancy H.
Chau, Strategic Amnesty and Credible Immigration Reform, 19 J. LAB. EcON. 604 (2001).

For emerging work by immigration scholars, see, for example, Eleanor M. Brown, Outsourcing Immigration Compliance (Harv. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research
Paper No. 08-12, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
1131022.
Reprinted with permission of New York University School of Law
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of the relationship between these variables, one can explain some of
the variation in the rights granted to migrants.
I
BACKGROUND

This Part begins by introducing the relevant conceptual distinctions and briefly explaining the contingent nature of migrants' rights
in American law.
A.

Conceptual Distinctions

In determining how many people to admit, and what type, the
host country must also resolve a number of difficult questions
regarding how migrants, once in its territory, are to be treated. Consider the following baseline: Migrants are treated exactly the same as
citizens. The baseline system entails that once a person is lawfully
admitted into the host country, she would have the right to vote, the
protection of the criminal process, etc. She could not be removed, for
removal is identical to exile, and citizens may not be exiled. She
would also have certain obligations: to follow the law, to pay taxes, to
serve on juries, etc.
In practice, this baseline never prevails. No state treats migrants
exactly the same as citizens. To clarify the differences, we make several conceptual distinctions.
1.

Rights Versus Obligations

Citizens have various obligations. Broadly, they must obey the
law, which usually involves duties such as paying taxes, sitting on
juries (in the United States), and serving in the military (in many
countries). Citizens also have rights, such as free speech, a trial prior
to punishment for a crime, and property ownership. There have been
cases in history where noncitizens have had privileges exempting them
from obeying some or all of the laws that bind citizens.14 Today, these
privileges are relatively minor, such as the privilege not to serve on a
jury in the United States. For the most part, we will assume that citizens and noncitizens have the same obligation to comply with general
law, such as tax law. Our focus is on rights.
14 Foreign diplomats are the classic example here. See 22 U.S.C. § 254(b) (2006)
(granting "privileges and immunities" to foreign diplomatic and consular officers in accord
with Vienna Convention and executive decree).
Reprinted with permission of New York University School of Law
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Right to Political Participation

In democracies, citizens have the right to vote, to join political
organizations, to voice political opinions, and to participate in other
ways in the democratic process. Noncitizens generally have no voting
rights (although there are some minor exceptions). 15 Noncitizens may
also be subject to certain restrictions on lobbying. 16 However, noncitizens generally enjoy the same speech and association rights that
citizens do. 17 In principle, political participation rights could be further disaggregated. Noncitizens could be given the right to vote but
not to join parties, for example, or to vote on certain issues but not on
others, or to vote for candidates for some offices but not for others.
3.

Right to Remain

In the United States and most other countries, citizens have the
right not to be exiled.1 8 Historically, exile was a common punishment,1 9 but no more. In contrast, noncitizens have circumscribed
rights to remain. In the United States, for example, noncitizens may
20
be removed if they pose a security threat or commit a serious crime.
In addition, noncitizens may be removed if their visas expire and they
do not obtain the right to permanent residency. Unlike citizens,
noncitizens who leave American territory may, under certain circumstances, be denied reentry. 21 These rights could be even further disaggregated. For example, a migrant could have the right to remain
unless a war between her country and the host country erupts.
15 See, e.g., ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT
OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES

To VOTE: THE

CONTESTED HISTORY

33-40 (2000) (discussing history of noncitizen

voting in United States).
16 See Bruce D. Brown, Alien Donors: The Participationof Non-citizens in the U.S.
Campaign Finance System, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 503, 508-18 (1997) (summarizing
current federal statutory prohibitions against campaign contributions by foreign nationals
who are not lawful permanent residents).
17 See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) ("Freedom of speech and of
press is accorded [to] aliens residing in this country." (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252 (1941))).
18 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 67 (2001) (noting that citizen of United States has
"the absolute right to enter its borders"); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967)
(prohibiting government from exiling citizen by first stripping him of citizenship).
19 See, e.g., GORDON P. KELLY, A HISTORY OF EXILE IN THE ROMAN REPUBLIC (2006).
20 See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(2)-(6) (2006)
(enumerating grounds of deportability).
21 See INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (specifying circumstances under which
even lawful permanent resident who travels abroad will be considered to be "seeking an
admission" and, therefore, subject to determination of inadmissibility); Shaughnessy v.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 214-15 (1953) (upholding government's decision to deny reentry to
longtime permanent resident who traveled abroad).
Reprinted with permission of New York University School of Law
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"Basic Rights"

Citizens in the United States and most other democracies have
many other rights, including the right to criminal process if they are
accused of a crime, the right to own property and to receive compensation if it is confiscated by the state, the right to bring civil actions,
and the right to be free from racial discrimination, among others. We
will call these general or baseline rights "basic rights. '22 In principle,
noncitizens could be denied these rights, or be given weaker protections. At least in the United States today, they generally are not
(though there are exceptions and ambiguities). 23 The most important
exception is the right to work: Many migrants do not have the right to
24
work, or have the right to work but not to change jobs.
5.

The Temporal Dimension of Rights

As a broad generalization, noncitizens gain more and stronger
rights the longer they lawfully remain in the host country. 25 One
might distinguish among people on temporary visas, lawful permanent

residents, and citizens. Migrants in these different categories are
often accorded different rights;2 6 in addition, they are also sometimes
22 There is nothing talismanic about this label. Moreover, there is obviously some conceptual overlap among the three categories of rights we have identified. Our aim here is
not to provide a comprehensive account of rights; rather, it is simply to delineate a few
rough-and-ready distinctions that will facilitate the description of our model and help make
sense of some common (and important) distinctions in immigration law and policy.
23 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ...
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.");
Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 491-92 (1931) (holding that
Takings Clause applies to property in United States owned by noncitizens); Wong Wing v.
United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (holding that noncitizens are entitled to
Constitution's criminal procedure protections). Historically, some of these basic rights
were restricted. For example, property ownership by noncitizens was controversial in early
America. See infra notes 69, 162.
24 See Juan Carlos Linares, Hired Hands Needed: The Impact of Globalization and
Human Rights Law on Migrant Workers in the United States, 34 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
321, 329-37 (2006) (detailing restrictions on seeking new employment that were placed on
migrant laborers under Bracero and H-2A programs, which imported workers from
Mexico, Bahamas, and West Indies).
25 See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) ("[Ojnce an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his
constitutional status changes accordingly.").
26 For example, lawful permanent residents can remain indefinitely and are free to
work almost anywhere (or not at all). However, many migrants in the United States on
temporary employment visas must leave the country after a few months or years and are
not free to change jobs. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 396-438 (6th ed. 2008) (describing migrant
categories).
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given the right to move from one category to another. 27 Our focus
will be principally on lawful permanent residents, who are people
given permission to remain in a host country indefinitely. But an
important issue is whether and under what conditions migrants are
permitted to move from one category to another.
6.

The Expressive Value of Citizenship

Citizenship may have a distinctive value irrespective of the legal
rights and obligations associated with it. Imagine that the formal
status of "citizen," a label, is a separate legal right. That label might
itself be important, even if it does not directly create any formal rights
or obligations. 28 For example, the state could use the formal status as
a signaling mechanism-as a signal to others about the person
accorded the status or as a signal to the person herself. 29 To keep our
analysis within reasonable bounds, we will ignore the expressive
dimension of citizenship. Citizenship is a valuable status in large part
because of the legal rights and privileges associated with it. Those
rights will be our focus.
As we proceed with our analysis, we will hold the baseline rights
of citizens constant and ask what explains the difference between
migrants' rights and citizens' rights.
B.

The Contingency of Migrant Rights in the United States

Our general approach assumes that migrant rights are a policy
choice. While this assumption is certainly a simplification, it is not
contrived. The legal relationship in the United States among the bundled rights often associated with citizenship is complex, but a central
feature is clear: The government retains considerable flexibility to
adjust these rights for noncitizens.
This is true even if we treat constitutional law as an exogenous
constraint on government action. American constitutional law
imposes only modest restrictions on Congress's authority to grant
27 See INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006) (adjustment of status); INA § 316, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1427 (naturalization rules).
28 Consider the analogy to contemporary debates about gay marriage, where some
argue that the legal label of "marriage" is important even if identical legal rights and obligations attach to both marriage and some other status like domestic partnership. See
George W. Dent, Jr., How Does Same-Sex Marriage Threaten You?, 59 RUTGERS L. REV.
233, 252-53 (2007) (arguing that recognition of same-sex marriage would alter popular
attitudes).
29 See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 112-33 (2002) (discussing signaling
and its relationship to status); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 355-75 (1997) (discussing conditions under which
desire for esteem creates norms and discussing reasons such norms may be strong).
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rights to, or withhold rights from, migrants who have not acquired the

formal status of citizenship. Constitutional law is most demanding
with respect to basic rights: It obligates the state to afford all resident
noncitizens basic criminal protections, 30 to refrain from discriminating
against noncitizens on the basis of race, 31 and so on. As we described
above, the main exception is the right to work.
But modern constitutional law places few limits on the government's ability to adjust up or down the right to remain and the participation rights of noncitizens. The right to remain is almost entirely
unprotected by the Constitution. The Supreme Court does place
some procedural restrictions on deportation, 32 and it may (though it is
contested) prohibit the government from deporting noncitizens on the
basis of their race 33 or the content of their speech. 34 Those limits
aside, the government is free to remove noncitizens from the country
for essentially any reason, and it can change retroactively the grounds
of deportation.

35

Matters are similar for political rights. There are a few constitutional protections: The First Amendment protects noncitizens'
freedom to speak out on political matters, 36 and migrants cannot be
excluded from some forms of government employment. 37 Nonethe-

less, the government can deny the most valuable right of participation:
the right to vote. 38 The government also has wide latitude to
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896).
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
32 See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903) (holding that noncitizens should
have "all opportunity to be heard upon the questions involving [their] right[s] to be and
remain in the United States").
33 Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discriminationand the ConstitutionalLaw of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 66-72 (1998) (arguing that Court today
would not uphold racial classifications in deportation law).
34 See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 487-92
(1999) (leaving open possibility that selective deportation on basis of First Amendment
activity may be prohibited in rare "outrageous" cases).
35 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 723-24 (1893) (holding retroactive
change to deportability grounds constitutionally permissible).
36 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1945).
37 See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 436-41 (1982) (observing that discrimination on basis of citizenship is highly suspect when employment serves economic
rather than political goals); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643 (1973) (holding N.Y.
CIVIL SERVICE LAw § 53(1) (Supp. 1972-1973) violated Equal Protection Clause because it
prohibited all aliens from holding civil service positions).
38 See Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutionaland
Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1431-41 (1993)
(explaining that U.S. constitutional law has never been read to require enfranchisement of
noncitizens); see also infra text accompanying notes 63-65, 118-27 (discussing why voting
rights can be valuable for migrants and conditions under which they are likely to be most
valuable).
30
31
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restrict the rights of noncitizens to contribute to election campaigns.

39

For citizens, matters are quite different. American constitutional
law provides citizens an absolute right against exile and confers on
them considerably more robust protection for political rights. 40 Moreover, it prevents the government from circumventing these rights by
41
stripping people of citizenship.
It is important to note, however, that nothing prevents the government from giving this more generous suite of rights to noncitizens.
While constitutional law provides a floor of certain rights, it generally
does not establish a ceiling. It need not be this way. The Constitution
could establish a ceiling by prohibiting the government from granting
voting rights to noncitizens or even from offering them the right of
permanent residence without naturalization. The Constitution does
contain at least one such ceiling: It prohibits noncitizens from holding
certain elected offices. A person must have been a citizen for many
years to be eligible for election to the U.S. Senate or House of Representatives (nine years for the Senate; seven years for the House). 42 To
be eligible for the Presidency, a person must be not only a long-term
resident but also a "natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United
States, at the time of the Adoption of [the] Constitution. '43 In general, however, the absence of such ceilings is part of what gives the
government such flexibility.
In practice, the United States often grants legal rights that are
more generous than what the Constitution requires. The generosity of
these rights often depends on visa status and the migrants' length of
residence. This is true for access to public assistance, which federal
law makes available to permanent residents after five years; 44 for the
right to reside, which immigration law protects somewhat more for
39 See Note, "Foreign" Campaign Contributionsand the First Amendment, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 1886, 1887-90, 1897-98 (1997) (noting current restrictions on campaign contributions by aliens but arguing that Congress should not be able to restrict aliens' First Amendment rights in that realm).
40 See supra note 18 (discussing right against exile). See generally SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY:
LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (3d ed. 2007) (surveying structure of polit-

ical rights in America).
41 See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (holding that citizen may not be
stripped of her citizenship unless it is relinquished voluntarily).

42 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3.
43 Id. art. II, § 1.
44 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1612-1613 (2006) (describing circumstances under which permanent residents can
become eligible for public assistance and other federal benefits).
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long-term residents; 45 and for the right to vote, which is usually provided only upon naturalization after an extended period of residence. 46 Moreover, as the above examples suggest, migrants' rights
are often treated by American law as though they have a sort of necessary hierarchy, with basic rights at the bottom, the right to reside in
the middle, and participation rights at the top. But there is nothing
about American constitutional law that makes this hierarchy
necessary.
The current state of immigration law should not blind one to the
possibility of different patterns. Indeed, American history supplies a
striking example that is germane to our focus on migrant voting rights.
In the nineteenth century, when many parts of the country were
sparsely populated, encouraging settlement was a priority. Migrants
could provide much-needed labor and, it was hoped, "raise land
values, stimulate economic development, and generate tax revenues."'47 In 1789, the first Congress authorized aliens to vote in the
Northwest Territories. 48 And beginning in the 1820s, western states
began conferring voting rights on so-called "declarant" noncitizens.
Immigrants in this period could officially declare their intention to
become citizens (by filing what were known as "first papers") after
living in the United States for at least two years. 49 Just like today,
they were ineligible to naturalize until they satisfied the full five-yearresidency requirement. But western states trimmed their wait for
voting rights to a short two years by conditioning the franchise on the
50
declaration rather than on naturalization.
The spread of declarant voting laws suggests that the franchise
was a valuable inducement for immigrants during this period. During
a fight over the adoption of such a rule in Illinois, one legislator
remarked that the right to vote was "the greatest inducement for men
to come amongst us."' 5 1 Thus, competition for settlers seems to have
played an important role in the expansion of noncitizen voting. While
noncitizen voting rules eventually waned (in part because of rising
45 See INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) (2006) (describing "cancellation of removal,"
which allows long-term residents to avoid deportation in some situations where they have
engaged in otherwise deportable conduct).
46 See INA § 316, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (setting out durational residency requirement for
naturalization).
47 KEYSSAR, supra note 15, at 38.
48 See Raskin, supra note 38, at 1402 ("[Congress's re-enactment of the 1787 Northwest] Ordinance gave freehold aliens who had been residents for two years the right to
vote for representatives to territorial legislatures, and gave wealthier resident aliens who
had been residents for three years the right to serve in these bodies.").
49 See MOTOMURA, supra note 3, at 115-16 (describing declaration process).
50 KFYSSAR, supra note 15, at 33.
51 Id. at 38-39.
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nativist sentiment and concerns about the growing political power of
immigrants), at their peak they were adopted by more than a dozen
states and were common everywhere outside the densely populated
52
Northeast.
Thus, the U.S. government, and the states as well, have had a
great deal of flexibility in granting rights to migrants, and have used
this flexibility for the purpose of attracting migrants and encouraging
them to invest. We turn now to an analysis of the costs and benefits of
different rights allocations.
II
THE BASIC THEORY

To explore the question of why migrants might be accorded a particular suite of rights by a host country, this Part first examines why
noncitizens may value different types of rights in different ways.
Noncitizens may value rights differently depending on their purposes
for entering a country and the various institutional, political, and economic aspects of that country that attract (or repel) them. This Part
then turns from migrants to nation-states, examining the "costs" that
states incur when they grant rights to noncitizens. Here, we focus on
the citizens of these states and ask what they lose when they give
rights to noncitizens, and thus what rights they would be willing to
grant to noncitizens in order to obtain the benefits of migration into
their country. Putting these arguments together, we develop several
hypotheses that explain what conditions might prompt a state to give a
particular bundle of rights to migrants.
We begin with a simplified setup where a host country like the
United States has migration policies that reflect the interests of its
citizens. 53 We assume that citizens benefit from a certain amount and
type of migration. This assumption is uncontroversial; few states, if
any, prohibit immigration. However, there is a great deal of variation
in how states benefit from immigration. Let us suppose that our hypothetical host country, modeled on the United States, gains from both
unskilled and skilled labor. A larger workforce reduces the cost of
goods and increases tax revenues that finance public goods, and while
migration also reduces wages and increases congestion, we will
imagine that our host country will choose a quantity of migration that
maximizes net benefits. Note also that the host country will have
Id. at 33, 83-87.
We assume a country like the United States-a modern democracy that enjoys the
rule of law-because we are interested in the role that law generally, and rights of political
participation in particular, play in our contract framework. A dictatorship with little
respect for the rule of law would raise different questions.
52
53
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varying preferences for different types of migrants, including skilled
versus unskilled, temporary workers versus people who intend to
establish permanent residence, people who have family relationships
with citizens, and refugees.
Demand Side: What Migrants Want
Migrants benefit from rights for the same reason that citizens do:
Rights protect them from the actions of individuals and governments
that might harm their interests. All else equal, a migrant will gain
when the host country grants her legal and constitutional rights. Legal
rights protect her from other people, arbitrary actions by the executive branch, and so forth; constitutional rights protect her from the
state.
Let us make these points more concrete. A person who contemplates migrating to a Receiving State must make two decisions: first,
whether to enter or not, and second, the degree of country-specific
investment to make after entering. The first decision is straightforward; the second requires some discussion.
Entering and living in a foreign country entails two types of costs:
variable costs and fixed costs. Variable costs include the day-to-day
costs of living and working such as renting a residence and buying
food. Many of these costs are financial; others are psychological or
emotional but just as real-for example, the cost of being far away
from one's family, from native speakers of one's language, or from
54
people of a common culture.
Fixed costs are those one-time expenses that a person incurs in
the course of obtaining skills or assets that enable her to reduce her
variable costs over the long term. In this straightforward sense, fixed
costs are investments: One incurs the costs at some early time and
enjoys the returns (in the form of reduced variable costs) over an
extended period of time or at a later date. 55 For example, a person
might learn the language of the host country, either prior to or after
entry. Learning the language is an investment: Once the migrant
learns the language, her variable costs of living in the host country will
A.

54 See, e.g., Douglas S. Massey & Felipe Garcfa Espafia, The Social Process of International Migration, 237 Sci. 733, 734 (1987) (discussing psychic costs of migration resulting
from social and cultural distance between Receiving and Sending States); Larry A.
Sjaastad, The Costs and Returns of Human Migration, 70 J. POL. ECON. 80, 84-85 (1962)
(discussing psychic costs of migration that arise when people have to leave behind family
and friends).
55 See, e.g., Barry R. Chiswick & Paul W. Miller, The Determinantsof Post-immigration
Investments in Education, 13 ECON. EDuc. REV. 163, 167 (1994) (analyzing post-migration
education decisions as decisions about whether to incur some fixed cost in order to obtain
returns over duration of migrants' stay).
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be lower. It will be easier to interact with people, fewer mistakes will
be made, and translators and interpreters need not be hired. Other
fixed costs include learning and absorbing cultural and social norms
that enable the migrant to interact more effectively with the native
people of the host country.
These fixed costs are often, but not always, country-specific. A
country-specific investment is an investment (in money, time, and/or
effort) that generates a return that has value only, or predominantly,
in one particular country. 56 An American who learns Japanese in
anticipation of moving to Japan makes a country-specific investment:
The American can enjoy most of the benefits of knowing Japanese
only if she stays in Japan. To be sure, she may also enjoy some benefits by staying in the United States and interacting with Japanese
speakers in commercial or social settings, or by enjoying Japanese
literature, but these benefits will generally be small compared to the
gains from being employed in Japan. 57 A Japanese citizen who learns
English also makes an investment, but this investment is not nearly as
country-specific: She can travel to the United States, the United
Kingdom, Australia, and other English-speaking countries, and indeed
probably can obtain substantial returns even by staying in Japan. In
fact, some investments can actually be more valuable to a migrant if
she returns to her country of origin than if she remains in the host
country. 58 Thus, the extent to which an investment in languagelearning is country-specific depends on several factors, but as a general rule, learning a country's language and culture is a countryspecific investment.
As noted above, country-specific investments can take place prior
to admission to the host country. But often the most significant
country-specific investments occur after admission. Many migrants
learn the host country's language only after migration. Others
improve their linguistic skills after migrating by interacting with citizens of the host country. 59 Also of great importance, migrants make
country-specific investments by learning social and cultural norms,
acquiring friends and associates among members of the host country,
and in a general way obtaining local knowledge that is necessary to
56 For further discussion of this concept, see Cox & Posner, supra note 10, at 828.
57 See Christian Dustmann, Temporary Migration, Human Capital,and Language Fluency of Migrants, 101 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 297, 312 (1999) (analyzing relationship
between investment in learning language and expected duration of residency).
58 For a discussion of this motive for return migration, see Christian Dustmann, Savings
Behavior of Return Migrants:A Life-Cycle Analysis, 115 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSUND SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN 511, 528 (1995).
59 RICHARD ALBA & VICTOR NEE, REMAKING THE AMERICAN MAINSTREAM: ASSIMILATION AND CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION 71-77, 217-30 (2003).
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live successfully in the host country. 60 All these investments are
country-specific because they are lost-that is, the return on the
investments cannot be obtained, or can be obtained only in greatly
diminished form-if the migrant is forced to leave the country
prematurely.
Our basic claim is that many (but not all) potential migrants can
benefit most from migration if they make country-specific investments
and remain in the country long enough to obtain the full return on
those investments, which may often be a lifetime. A migrant in this
group will therefore naturally worry that the premise of these countryspecific investments-that she will remain in the host country for a
long period of time (if she so chooses) and that certain social and institutional features of the host country will remain constant-may be
incorrect. She will therefore make country-specific investments only
if she can predict that this premise will remain correct with a high
enough probability. 61
It should now be clear that our framework provides a central
reason why migrants value rights: Rights protect their countryspecific investments. 62 Minimal basic rights, such as the right to own
property, will obviously matter to the migrant. If she cannot keep the
returns on her investment-such as her paycheck-she will not make
the investment. But these minimal basic rights will often be
insufficient.
The migrant will also often desire the right to remain. One might
think that as long as a migrant can keep her paychecks and sell her
property before being removed, she would not need a right to remain.
After all, these benefits should cover her variable costs from living in
the host country, and so she gains on net. However, she values the
right to remain in part because she cannot recover her countryspecific investments unless she can stay in the host country for a long
60 See ALBA & NEE, supra note 59, at 260-70 (portraying effects of social relationships,
including friendships and intermarriage, on immigrant acculturation patterns).
61 Other migrants, however, may have no desire to make country-specific investments.
For example, some noncitizens may be interested only in entering temporarily to engage in
seasonal agricultural work.
62 The claim that migrants value rights for this reason depends on migrants understanding the consequences of particular legal rights. Our basic model assumes that
migrants have good information about the strength and scope of the host country's protections of migrants' rights. Obviously, some prospective migrants simply will not be familiar
with the host country's laws and policies. Moreover, migrants from transitional democracies or countries with high levels of lawless behavior by officials may be skeptical that
political participation or legal rights can actually protect their interests. This highlights the
extent to which information policy can be an important aspect of a state's immigration
policy. See Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law's Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
341, 387-89 (2008).
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enough period of time. The longer the duration of the right to remain,
the higher the returns on country-specific investment and, therefore,
the greater the country-specific investment that the migrant will make.
Political rights will also often be important to migrants. Even a
migrant who enjoys the basic right to keep her property and the right
to remain takes risks when migrating. The migrant also cares about
her quality of life in the host country. This includes such things as the
quality of the schools (if she has children), the convenience of parks,
the degree of public safety, and other public goods supplied by the
government. In particular, migrants will always be concerned about
xenophobic reactions that result in harassment of migrants or new
laws that limit their freedom and reduce their quality of life. 63 History
shows with great clarity that a population that welcomes migrants
when jobs are plentiful and the world is at peace will often turn
against them during an economic downturn or an international
crisis. 64 Strong migrants' rights bar such a reaction or mitigate its
consequences.
Basic rights and the right to remain will, if enforced, prevent the
worst forms of harassment. But migrants would prefer greater protection; they will worry that their rights could be changed ex post or go
unenforced. One might imagine that migrants would want some sort
of guarantee that the public policy of the host country will not change
in some undesirable way. However, this is surely impractical. Conditions change and governments must adopt new policies to address new
problems that arise. Thus, the migrant's most realistic protection
against new policies that reflect change but that disappoint the
migrant's reasonable expectations is the right to vote and to engage in
other forms of political participation. The migrant can potentially use
her vote to block policy changes that benefit citizens little while
harming migrants a great deal, but not to block policy changes that
benefit citizens a great deal while harming migrants only a littlepolicy changes that are more likely to be justified by new conditions.
Because citizens are more likely to be divided over policies that
benefit them little, the migrant vote can tip the balance. To be sure,
one vote does not make a difference, but when a large number of
63

See generally JOHN

HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND:

PATTERNS OF AMERICAN

NATIVISM, 1860-1925 (2d ed. 1992) (chronicalling American history of nativist reactions to
immigration).
64 See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM

THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 29-33, 283-303 (2004)
(describing rise of nativism in times of war); ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY
DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA 87-90, 153-56 (2006)
(linking nativism to national-security and economic troubles).
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migrants have located in the host country, or within a particular town
or area of the host country, their combined voting power may mitigate
the amount of official and unofficial harassment that might occur
65
during a period of stress.
Our final point is that basic rights, the right to remain, and
political rights matter more to people who make greater countryspecific investments and therefore need a longer period of time and
greater freedom to obtain a sufficient return on those investments. 66
If migrants do not make country-specific investments, they may still
value rights, but they will likely not value them as much. For that
reason, permanent migrants generally value rights more than temporary migrants. 67 Permanent migrants seek to establish a permanent
residence in the host country. For them, country-specific investments
are highly valuable. Temporary migrants seek to stay only for a limited period-to work, to obtain an education, to tour, to visit friends.
For them, country-specific investments are often much less valuable.
For example, a Russian exchange student is likely to value rights much
less than a Japanese academic who joins a university faculty and
expects to remain in the United States for the indefinite future.
To sum up, in this basic model, migrants who make greater
country-specific investments value rights more than migrants who
make fewer or no country-specific investments. But all migrants will
value rights at least a little. This point can be put another way.
Holding the type of migrant constant, a migrant or potential migrant
will make greater country-specific investments, the greater the rights
protections in the host country.
B.

Supply Side: What States Want

When a state grants rights to migrants, it incurs costs. Some of
these costs are straightforward. If a migrant has the right to enjoy her
property, then the state cannot confiscate her property and distribute
revenues to grateful citizens. If a migrant has the right to criminal
process, then the state cannot summarily throw her in jail if it suspects
she committed a crime or poses a threat to others. Also, the state
65 As the discussion below will make clear, uncertainty about the future and changing
circumstances is not the only reason migrants might value political rights. They are also
valuable as a precommitment device. We discuss precommitment in Part II.C infra.
66 This does not mean that migrants who intend to stay permanently will always want to
naturalize as quickly as possible in order to obtain the largest suite of available rights.
There are a number of reasons why naturalization can be costly for migrants. See infra
notes 173-78 and accompanying text (discussing some costs of dual citizenship and of relinquishing citizenship in Sending State).
67 Of course, migrants who arrive in the host country thinking that their stay is temporary may change their intentions over time.
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must divert valuable police and judicial resources to the protection of
migrants from citizens who seek to harass them.
Why, then, do states give migrants these basic rights? We could
imagine a host country announcing that migrants are welcome but
that they have no rights. As a matter of historical practice, this type of
situation sometimes occurs. 68 But it is hard to imagine that a host
country with such a policy would attract many migrants. A migrant
who entered a country where she was given literally no rights would
take the risk of being immediately stripped of all her possessions. The
government could summarily take all her possessions and enslave or
kill her. Ordinary people could do the same, and she would have no
ability to call on the government for protection. Thus, a state would
attract no migrants-except in highly unusual cases, such as a Wild
West situation where people band into groups for protection and try
to quickly exploit natural resources-unless it gave migrants at least
minimal basic rights. For that reason, basic rights would seem to be a
69
sine qua non of migration.
As we noted from the start, all states benefit from migration, but
each state has unique needs and interests. Consider a state that needs
only seasonal unskilled labor from people who live just across the
border. Suppose further that these people would earn a higher wage
in the host country than they do at home. Such people, if granted only
basic rights, would likely be willing to engage in seasonal migration, to
their and the host country's mutual benefit.
Now, let us consider the right to remain. Let us imagine that the
host country faces two possible futures: a "good condition," where
the current demand for migrant labor continues; and a "bad condition," where the demand collapses because of a crisis, a war, or an
68 Descriptions of gold mining in California during the gold rush sometimes have this
flavor. See, e.g., JOHN R. UMBECK, A THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS WITH APPLICATION
TO THE CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH 4-5 (1981) (describing how property rights emerged in
absence of effective legal system during gold rush).
69 However, as noted above, some basic rights-including the right to choose one's
employer, or even to work at all-can be restricted. And historically other basic rights,
such as the right to own property, were often restricted. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633, 645-47 (1948) (holding unconstitutional California laws that prohibited land
ownership by persons ineligible for citizenship, which under naturalization rules at time
meant principally Japanese immigrants); Irene Bloemraad, Citizenship Lessons from the
Past: The Contours of Immigrant Naturalizationin the Early 20th Century, 87 Soc. Sci. Q.
927, 942-44 (2006) (noting that, from post-founding period through early twentieth century, many states restricted property rights on basis of citizenship); Polly J. Price, Alien
Land Restrictions in the American Common Law: Exploring the Relative Autonomy Paradigm, 43 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 152, 155-82 (1999) (discussing early common law restrictions
on land ownership by noncitizens); Joshua Weisman, Restrictions on the Acquisition of
Land by Aliens, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 39 (1980); see also infra note 162 and accompanying
text.
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economic downturn, and local citizens turn against migrants and want
them expelled.
If the good condition occurs, then granting the right to remain is
relatively cheap for the host country. Under such a condition,
although the host country might prefer to remove the noncitizen to
satisfy some passing political demand-perhaps reflecting temporary
changes in public sentiment or institutional spasms or occasional
opportunistic desires to extract revenues from them-the political
benefits from such removal are likely to be minimal and hence the
cost of the right to remain is low.
But if the bad condition occurs, then granting the right to remain
becomes costly. Under such conditions, the host country cannot satisfy popular demand to expel the migrants, and there will be political
as well as financial costs from respecting the right to remain.
The host country has little reason to grant the right to remain to
the seasonal migrants described above. Those temporary migrants do
not value the right to remain very much because they do not intend to
remain for long periods and are much less likely to make countryspecific investments regardless of the scope of their rights. To put this
point more precisely, the joint value of the migration for the migrants
themselves and the host country is not maximized from a countryspecific investment on the part of the migrants. Accordingly, the host
country does not need to grant the right to remain in order to secure
the desired level of entry and investment by temporary migrants.
Suppose, however, that a country seeks migrants-skilled or
unskilled-who will settle permanently. These migrants, who plan to
settle permanently in the host country, will need to learn the language
and make other country-specific investments. More precisely, a
migrant will obtain the highest return from settling in the host country
permanently if she first makes a country-specific investment in
learning the local language and culture and continues to make
country-specific investments after she arrives. Since she can obtain a
sufficient return on her country-specific investment only if she can
remain in the host country for as long as she wants, she will want more
than basic rights: She will want the right to remain.
The problem for the state is that if it grants migrants the right to
remain, it will not be able to remove them if circumstances change and
the bad condition occurs. So the state will grant migrants the right to
remain only if the expected cost of that right is less than the overall
benefit to the state. A migrant might well prefer an absolute right to
remain-that is, a right that prevails in the bad as well as in the good
condition. But if the states can credibly promise to remove the
migrant only in the bad condition, many people will still migrate and
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make country-specific investments-just as long as the bad condition
is sufficiently unlikely to occur, as in the case of a major war or catastrophe, for example.
Remember that migrants also care about their environment, not
just their right to reside in the host country. Basic rights can protect
some aspects of their lives, but participation rights give them a way to
affect the future bundle of public goods supplied by the government.
Thus, participation rights are an important way migrants can improve
their well-being in the host country.
For the host country, however, participation rights may enable
migrants to influence public policy in a manner that hurts the interests
of native citizens. 70 Suppose, for example, that native citizens have a
strong preference for maintaining high-quality public parks but that
migrants care less about parks and more about the quality of roads. If
migrants have participation rights, then they could cause the government to reduce spending on parks and increase spending on roads. Ex
ante, native citizens will prefer their country not to grant participation
rights to migrants, so as to maintain complete control over public
policy.
The state will make the same cost-benefit calculation with participation rights that it made with the right to remain. If more migrants
will enter and make optimal country-specific investments when they
receive participation rights, such that the gains for citizens (lower
taxes, cheaper goods, etc.) are greater than the costs (congestion,
adverse public policy, etc.), then the state will grant participation
rights to noncitizens.
There is a further consideration here, however. Granting participation rights to migrants may be less costly to citizens when there are
relatively few migrants or when migrant political preferences are close
to those of citizens. Thus, a state may be more willing to grant participation rights, as opposed to merely granting rights to remain, when
the expected migration flows are relatively small or when they consist
71
of people whose values and interests are similar to those of citizens.
However, by the same token, those migrants may also value participa-

70 By "native citizens" we mean the people living in the host country who have rights at
the time that a particular migrant enters.
71 There is some evidence that governments are, in fact, more likely to enfranchise new
groups of voters when those groups are relatively small in comparison to the existing pool
of voters. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUnON: A BIOGRAPHY 419-20 (2005);
Sebastian Braun & Michael Kvasnicka, Men, Women, and the Ballot: Woman Suffrage in
the United States 3-4 (Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Discussion Paper No. 2009-016, 2009),
available at http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/papers/pdf/SFB649DP2009-016.pdf.
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tion rights less because they are not numerous enough to be able to
72
form a meaningful voting bloc.
As an aside, note that states will not be likely to "bribe" people
to migrate by offering them significant cash payments because such
cash payments will not encourage migrants to make country-specific
investments unless the payments are conditioned on those investments, which is likely to be impractical. Instead, states offer migrants
legal rights that protect the value of their labor and other aspects of
their lives. These rights should encourage migrants to make optimal
country-specific investments, as long as they believe that the host
country will keep its commitment not to renege on these rights or
otherwise reduce the migrants' payoff.
C.

The Optimal Content of Migrant Rights

To evaluate policy choices, we imagine two agents: a migrant and
the state. At time 0, the migrant enters the state and has an initial
choice to make a country-specific investment or not. The investment
is costly but has positive net present value for the migrant as long as
she is permitted to stay for a sufficient length of time, during which
she can recover the cost by working and earning a wage. 73 The
migrant earns a higher wage if she invests than if she does not invest.
At the same time, the state benefits from the migrant's presence
because she reduces labor costs and pays taxes.
At time 1, events change. Normally, the state has no reason to
expel migrants or change the living conditions of migrants, but let us
put this normal condition aside for expository clarity. Let us define
the good condition as one in which the state gains by removing
migrants or subjecting them to harsher conditions, but the gain is relatively low. The bad condition-a crisis, a war, an economic downturn,
an influx of refugees-is the same except the gain is relatively high.
The state gains from removing migrants in both conditions, but gains
much more in the bad condition.
We assume that from the state's standpoint the optimal policy at
time 0 is one in which the migrant can be removed, or her living circumstances worsened, if the bad condition occurs but cannot be
removed or otherwise harmed if the good condition occurs. This is
because the state gains more from time 0 taxes than it loses in time 1 if
the good condition occurs, but the state gains less from time 0 taxes
72 In Part III.C infra, we relax this constraint and consider different ways in which
participation rights might impose costs on, or in some cases bring benefits to, the host
country.
73 We focus here on financial costs for expository simplicity. However, the model can
encompass all sorts of nonmonetary costs and benefits.
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than it loses in time 1 if the bad condition occurs. Moreover, the
migrant will enter and make a country-specific investment only if she
can recover that investment in time 1, and we suppose that she can, in
an expected sense, as long as she can stay if the good condition
prevails and the probability of the good condition is high enough. Yet
she knows that the state will have an incentive to remove her or make
her life worse even if the good condition occurs. Thus, in order to
encourage migration and investment, the state must commit itself not
to remove the migrant and to maintain her living standard in the good
74
condition but not in the bad condition.
Thus, an optimal contract between the host country and the
migrant would provide that the host country can remove the migrant
if the bad condition prevails but not if the good condition prevails.
How might such a contract appear in practice? History suggests two
prominent types of bad conditions: war (and other security alarms)
and economic downturns. During wars, migrants (especially those
from the enemy state) may be suspected of disloyalty and even espionage or sabotage. 75 During economic downturns, native citizens
76
might seek the expulsion of migrants who compete for scarce jobs.
The optimal contract therefore might stipulate that migrants can
remain in the host country unless a war or economic downturn occurs.
In practice, we tend to observe migration contracts that contain
the war condition but not the economic downturn condition. Governments typically retain the right to deport migrants if war breaks out
with the country of which they are nationals. 7 7 Migrants probably
understand these rules and indeed, as far as we know, migration
78
between traditional enemies is unusual.
In contrast, it is considerably rarer for countries to reserve an
explicit right to deport migrants during economic downturns. Why is
this? Economic downturns are hard to define-certainly harder to
74 This is the classic problem of time inconsistency, first analyzed in the economics
literature by Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON. 473 (1977).
75 See STONE, supra note 64, at 29-30, 283 (noting frequent suspicion of disloyalty of
aliens during wartime).
76 See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA 19-20 (2004) (citing job scarcity as factor leading to immigration
restriction).
77 See, e.g., Alien Enemies Act of 1798, 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (2006).
78 An important exception is British migration to the United States during the first half
of the nineteenth century. This case is unusual and may be explained by the historic ties
between the two countries. Moreover, countries sometimes welcome migrants who are
fleeing an enemy regime. During the cold war, the United States welcomed, through
asylum policies and other mechanisms, dissident citizens of the Soviet Union and its allies.
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define than war. 79 If the law provides that governments can remove
migrants if an economic downturn occurs, migrants might fear that the
government will engineer economic numbers that reflect a downturn
or seize on weak evidence to rationalize expulsions. But if the law is
more specific, then the government might fear that it will exclude a
genuine crisis that does not meet the law's definition. If governments
reserved the right to deport migrants during economic downturns,
then migrants might not have the security necessary to make countryspecific investments and hence might not migrate or might migrate
but not invest. 80
States usually take another tack. Instead of reserving a right to
deport under specified economic conditions, governments divide

migrants into classes and reserve discretionary rights with respect to
one class and not with respect to the other. In the most common
arrangement, migrants have limited rights for an initial period of
years, stronger rights for a second period of years, and then maximal
rights once they become citizens. For example, in the United States,
many migrants enter on temporary employment visas that allow them
to work for one particular employer but not for anyone else. 81 The
visa expires after three or five years, depending on the type of occupation, but can usually be renewed once. 82 At the expiration of the
second visa, the migrant may be able to become a lawful permanent
resident (LPR).8 3 An LPR has the right to change jobs and the (conditional) right to remain indefinitely, but not the right to vote. After
five years as an LPR, the migrant gains the legal right to naturalize,
whereupon she obtains the right to vote and the other privileges of
citizenship.8 4 Thus, migrants often enter as part of the initial class
with the expectation that if they remain in the country for a certain
79 This is not to say that the war condition does not raise any concerns about strategic
behavior by the government. Even if it is easy to define the existence of the bad state of
war, migrants might still worry that the government will use the war to rationalize deporta-

tion or discrimination that is really not related to any security threat. Many have argued
that the United States's history is replete with examples of such behavior. See, e.g., STONE,
supra note 64, at 287-96 (discussing internment of Japanese Americans in World War II).
80 Note that migrants' uncertainty about the verification process stems both from the
difficulty of specifying a clear rule and the worry that the state will interpret any less-thanclear rule it adopts in a self-interested fashion. Third-party verification organizations could
in theory be used to reduce the second concern, but we do not observe this in practice.
81 See INA § 214, 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (2006).
82 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(9)(iii)(A), (h)(15)(ii)(B) (2009).
83 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 26, at 437; cf. INA § 101(a)(15)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(B) (2006) (exempting H-1B visa holders from general requirement that any
recipient of temporary visa have "a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning"); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(16)(i) (2009) (allowing H-1B nonimmigrants to
enter on visa and to seek permanent residence simultaneously).
84 See INA § 316, 8 U.S.C. § 1427.
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amount of time, they will be able to make the transition to the higher
85
classes.
From the perspective of our model, these tiered classifications

reflect several policy considerations. First, they reflect the government's interest in attracting different types of migrants. Governments
classify migrants according to how much the state desires a particular
class of migrants, how much the successful migration of a particular
class hinges on country-specific investments, and so on. Highly desirable migrants are given more generous rights; less desirable migrants

are not. Migrants for whom country-specific investments are crucial
are given a more robust right to remain than migrants who value

entrance regardless of their ability to recoup any country-specific
investment. But even highly desirable migrants do not have the right
to freeze in place the government policies that prevailed when they
entered; such a right would be much too costly. Occasionally states do
give migrants some control over the conditions of their lives by giving

them voting rights, as some American states did during the nineteenth
century, 86 but in the United Sates today those rights do not come until
naturalization.
Second, the tiered classifications reflect an implicit compromise
between the two competing goals of encouraging entrance and
country-specific investment, on the one hand, and government flexibility, on the other hand.87 During an economic downturn, the gov-

ernment can expel short-term migrants, or refuse to renew their visas,
thus relieving some of the political pressure from native workers,
85 Because migrants are not required to make the transition to the higher classes, the
rights of migrants do not all increase solely by virtue of the passage of time. The bare
passage of time is important for some constitutional rights, such as procedural due process
rights. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-34 (1982) (noting that noncitizen's
due process rights grow as she "begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence"). It is also important for some statutory rights, such as the right to cancellation of
removal. See INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) ("The Attorney General may cancel
removal of [a deportable alien] if the alien ...has been physically present in the United
States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years .... "). But other rights are structured as options that the migrant acquires over time. If the migrant chooses not to exercise
her option-say, by not naturalizing-she will not acquire the additional rights.
86 See supra text accompanying notes 47-52.
87 An additional possibility relates to immigrant screening. An interesting feature of
this progressive accumulation of rights is that the migrant has a weaker incentive to make
country-specific investments initially, but the incentive strengthens over time. Correlatively, the Receiving State's flexibility decreases over time. One plausible explanation for
this arrangement is that the Receiving State obtains better information about the migrant
over time. It is optimal for the state to have flexibility when little is known about the
migrant; the state can cede flexibility as it becomes increasingly clear that the migrant
poses no threat and has integrated effectively. See Cox & Posner, supra note 10, at 824-35
(discussing costs and benefits of ex ante versus ex post screening of immigrants).
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while allowing long-term migrants to stay, thus encouraging some
degree of country-specific investment by future migrants. The legal
rights relating to transition are consistent with this compromise.
In the United States, for example, migrants have no formal right
to make the transition from their status as a temporary worker-say,
on an H-1B visa-to LPR status.8 8 This lowers the cost to the government of deciding during an economic downturn to cut off these
migrants' access to LPR status. 89 In contrast, the government lacks
legal discretion to deny naturalization to LPRs who satisfy the residency requirement and a few other requirements. 90
A further point is that even in the bad condition, migrants enjoy
basic rights-for example, they may keep their property. Thus, from
an ex ante perspective, migrants expect to retain at least some, even if
not all, of their expected gains. This compromise reflects the fact that
governments care most about eliminating security threats or labor
unrest in the bad condition, and can probably obtain little value by
confiscating migrants' property when migrants can remit money to
relatives overseas and in most cases do not accumulate much in the
first place. Basic property rights in the bad condition give the
migrants at least some incentive to make country-specific investments,
without interfering with the government's flexibility where it most
needs it.
Our model suggests other ways in which the optimal migration
contract could be designed. Suppose, for example, that the host
country retains the right to expel the migrant only upon payment of
some large sum to the migrant. The migrant might be willing to make
the country-specific investment knowing that even if she can be
expelled, she will be compensated to a degree for her investment. 91
The country retains flexibility and, if the demand for entry is high
enough, could even offset the cost by requiring the migrant to pay fees
88 Cf ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 26, at 437 (discussing formal legal distinction

between nonimmigrants and immigrants and describing way in which immigration system
has come in recent years to treat nonimmigrant admissions more like transition model
described above than like entirely separate track).
89 In fact, during the current financial crisis there have been calls in Congress for
significant restrictions on the H-1B visa program. Laura Crimaldi, Editorial, Walls Closing
on All Sides for Immigrants: Economic Crisis, Crackdown Hit Community Hard, Bos.
HERALD, Feb. 22, 2009, at 6. But see Hire Power, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 23, 2009, at 24

(arguing that restriction of H-1B visas will hurt financial sector).
90 See INA §§ 311-331, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1422-1442 (2006) (detailing eligibility and require-

ments of naturalization). Whether naturalization is discretionary or a matter of right is an
important design decision about which the United States has long taken a quite different

approach than most of Western Europe.
91 Options play an important role in the design of optimal contracts. See, e.g., BOLTON
& DEWATRIPONT, supra note 9, at 566-69 (describing role of options in optimal contracts).
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upon entry. Such a system would approximate an insurance scheme,
where the migrant in essence purchases an insurance policy upon
entry-a policy that pays out if the bad condition occurs and the
migrant is required to leave.
We do not observe such a system, though close variations have
recently cropped up. Spain, which absorbed large numbers of lowskilled migrants during a decade-long economic boom, has recently
begun offering those migrants cash if they leave the country. 92 While
the cash-for-leaving policy is structured as an option rather than a
requirement, it reflects the same basic logic: Spain can remove
migrants today while setting a precedent that encourages future
migrants to make country-specific investments when the economy
recovers. 93 This also suggests an additional wrinkle on our earlier discussion of precommitment. Spain may have been legally authorized
to revoke these migrants' work visas, but doing so might have made
future migrants more wary about immigrating to Spain or investing
after they arrived. A state that has the legal right to deport migrants
during economic downturns but routinely refrains from exercising that
right may in this way establish a reputation for allowing migrants to
stay. Such a reputation can serve as a precommitment mechanism
94
that encourages migrants to enter and invest.
Finally, states may try to compromise their need for flexibility
and the migrant's interest in security by granting voting rights to
migrants. Voting rights give migrants the power to form coalitions
that can block adverse legislation but, as long as migrants remain in
92 Christine Spolar, Spain Tries To Buy Out Immigrants, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 13, 2008, at 7;
see also Czech Republic To Pay Unemployed Foreign Workers To Go Home, REUTERS, Feb.
9, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE5185Y920090209 (noting
Czech government's offer to pay plane fare for foreign workers unable to pay for their own
return).
93 The Spanish policy is also likely driven by the fiscal consequences of retaining the
low-skilled migrants. During the last decade, Spain frequently regularized the status of
irregular workers and extended the social safety net to cover large numbers of immigrant
workers, in part to encourage their integration. As Spain's economy soured, however,
these migrants' eligibility for public assistance increased the state's fiscal burden. Spain
then offered many of the migrants lump-sum payments of a fraction of their unemployment benefits in exchange for promises that the migrants would leave the country and not
return for at least three years. Spolar, supra note 92.
94 See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC

A.

POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

100-04 (2005) (surveying reputational theories); Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State's
Reputation, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 231, 259-66 (2009) (discussing types of state reputation).
The power of a state's reputation depends on migrants having information about the state's
past practices and believing that the state will behave consistently across time. The United
States has a long history of deporting migrants during economic downturns. The mass
deportation of Filipinos and Mexicans (and Mexican-Americans) that took place during
the Depression is one prominent example. NGAI, supra note 76, at 120-26. But it is far
from certain that these historical episodes influence migrants' behavior today.
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the minority, not enough power to block adverse legislation that is
overwhelmingly in the interest of natives. If natives cannot form powerful anti-migrant coalitions in the good condition, but can in the bad
condition, then voting rights may have the same effect as the optimal
95
contract.
The arrangements we have discussed are sensitive to shifts in the
underlying variables. Consider first our claim that a war is more easily
verifiable than an economic downturn. This may well be true in general but there are telling exceptions. The current conflict with Islamic
extremists falls somewhere between a true war and a law enforcement
operation. In the wake of 9/11, the U.S. government did not expel
large numbers of migrants from Arab and Muslim countries with
heavy A1-Qaida presence, but it did subject these migrants to intrusive
monitoring programs. 96 These programs may well have seemed to
Arabs and Muslims to be a breach of their implicit migration contract
with the United States. Yet, for the U.S. government, a change in
circumstances justified a change in the law. However one looks at it,
migrants from the relevant countries will be more reluctant to enter
the United States and to make country-specific investments. 97 The
U.S. government's response has introduced uncertainty, which makes
the war condition more like the economic downturn condition, possibly leading to an outcome where few or no migrants enter and
invest.
To sum up, the optimal migration contract will provide that the
government may deport migrants if the bad condition occurs. However, if the bad condition is unverifiable, then the government has
three options: It may retain discretion to remove the migrant, it may
alter the migrant's living conditions, or it may give up that discretion
or the bulk of it. We observe the intermediate solution-the alteration of the migrant's living conditions-most clearly in the security
95 We discuss this argument in more detail in notes 74-91 and Part III.C infra.
96 DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREE-

47-56 (2003); Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely,
Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and
Muslims in the United States: Is Alien a Distinction Without a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 609, 620-32 (2005); Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing,and Immigration Law, 92
CAL. L. REV. 373, 413-14 (2004); Lawrence M. Lebowitz & Ira L. Podheiser, A Summary
of the Changes in Immigration Policies and Practices After the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, 2001: The USA PATRIOT Act and Other Measures, 63 U. Prrr. L. REV. 873,
880-81 (2002) (describing post 9/11 visa waiting period imposed on residents of Arab
countries).
97 Indeed, there are anecdotal accounts of Muslim immigrants choosing other destination states, like Canada, over the United States because of this uncertainty. Telephone
Interview with Ahilan Arulanantham, Staff Attorney, Am. Civil Liberties Union of S. Cal.
(Feb. 17, 2009).
DOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM
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context. In other circumstances, we observe governments dividing
people into classes with varying levels of protection. This results in
many migrants not making country-specific investments. The
migrants that decide to make country-specific investments do so either
because they receive protection immediately or are willing to risk
removal at time 1 in the hopes of obtaining protection and a return on
their investment in later periods.
When the underlying variables change, so should the law, and
here we can offer some rough predictions. If the technology for verifying good and bad conditions changes so that verification becomes
difficult, then governments will choose an extreme outcome-our AlQaida example, in which the government is unable to specify in
advance clear rules for identifying the sort of terrorist threat that
would trigger deportation or harsher treatment of some immigrants.
If the risk of the bad condition increases, then migrants' rights should
become weaker. And if the value of country-specific investments
increases-as might happen as a country moves from an agricultural
or traditional market economy to a "knowledge-based" economythen migrants' rights will become stronger.
D.

The Optimal Strength of Migrant Rights

The optimal contracting problem has an additional dimension not
present in ordinary contractual relations, where it can be assumed that
courts will enforce the contracts to which parties agree. Even if it
were possible to describe precisely the good and bad conditions, prospective migrants may worry that the state will renege on its obligations under the agreement. For example, the state might retroactively
change deportation law in a way that makes many noncitizens removable even in the good condition. Or, short of deportation, the state
might harass the migrants or otherwise make their lives miserable,
akin to constructive firing in the employment setting. This raises the
problem of the strength of rights, or, more precisely, their degree of
entrenchment.
Consider the difference between statutory and constitutional
rights. If migrants are given an absolute right to remain and this right
is statutory, then the state can eliminate this right merely by changing
the law. Now, in fact, it might be difficult to change the law, in which
case the right is robust. But, it might also be easy to change the law.
Alternatively, the right could be constitutional. If the right is
constitutional, it can still be changed, but doing so is more difficult. It
should be clear that generous rights (such as an absolute right to
remain) that are weakly entrenched may offer less protection than
Reprinted with permission of New York University School of Law
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weaker rights (such as a right to remain unless there is a war) that are
more strongly entrenched.
The three main sources of rights can be arranged from weakest to
strongest. Repeal of administrative rights can occur at the behest of
the executive alone. 98 Repeal of statutory rights requires the participation of Congress. Repeal of constitutional rights requires the satisfaction of various supermajority rules9 9 or the acquiescence of the
courts. All else equal, entry and country-specific investment will be
greater when rights are more highly entrenched than when they are
not. By the same token, the flexibility of the state is reduced. If the
state fails to anticipate a crisis or type of crisis, and thus does not
incorporate an option to remove into the basic legal scheme, it will not
be able to add such an option if the right to remain is sufficiently
entrenched.
Now consider a different possibility: giving the migrant the right
to vote. The right to vote is distinctive. Like the right to remain, it
can (in principle) be statutory or constitutional, and thus can be easier
or more difficult for other (citizen) voters to eliminate. Yet, the
migrant herself can exercise her right to vote and use it to elect officeholders who will support the migrant's rights. Thus, the right to vote
is, to a degree, self-entrenching. To be sure, it is worth little by itself;
but if there is a critical mass of migrants, the right to vote can be
powerful.
Unlike the right to remain, the value of the right to vote is a function of how many other migrants have that right and how native citizens are likely to exercise their own votes. If few other migrants in
the host country exist or few have the right to vote, or if native citizens
make up a large majority and vote in blocs, then a migrant is not likely
to value the right to vote. But in many cases, migrants will be able to
form blocs10 0 and make coalitions with groups of native citizens. This
will allow migrants to protect whatever interests they value the most.
Thus, participation rights can have distinctive value as a mechanism
for overcoming immigration law's precommitment problem.
How might host countries choose whether to protect the rights of
migrants administratively, statutorily, constitutionally, or through
voting rights? Our starting point-that many migrants gain from
making country-specific investments but that host countries want the
98 See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodrfguez, The Presidentand Immigration Law, 119
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 2-4, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/

papers.cfm?abstract id=1356963) (describing extent of President's authority in immigration policy).
99 See U.S. CONST. art. V.
100 See infra text accompanying notes 123-25.
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flexibility to remove migrants if the bad condition occurs-suggests
that some level of protection less than absolute will prevail. Let us
assume a baseline where the host country simply exercises administrative discretion and can retain or remove migrants at will. Migrants
might fear that the executive will remove them for political reasons
even when the bad condition does not occur and thus will refrain from
making country-specific investments. How might a host country
improve on this outcome?
First, a host country might pass a statute that provides for fully
secured rights. If migrants expect judges to interpret the statute fairly,
and if the legislature can repeal the statute only with great difficultyfor example, only if an emergency (the bad condition) exists-then
the statute might be an adequate solution. However, the legislature
itself might be no more trustworthy than the executive.
Second, a host country might constitutionalize the statute, thus
eliminating the ability of the legislature to overturn it. A host country
will do this if it expects that it can amend the constitution in an emergency or (what is more likely) that courts will fairly carve out exceptions for emergencies. Migrants would also need to trust the courts.
Third, a host country might instead grant the migrant voting
rights, thus giving her the ability to block self-serving interpretations
by the government or statutory revisions by the legislature. As we
noted above, a host country will most likely grant voting rights to
migrants who share the basic values and preferences of native citizens.
Migrants will be most likely to value these rights if they believe they
can form a coalition that is large enough to protect their interests.
In the United States, the rights of long-term migrants to remain
have, over the centuries, become to a limited extent constitutionalized. Yet, these constitutional rights remain minimal and mostly procedural rather than substantive. l0 1 For example, Congress is free to
pass statutes requiring the deportation of long-term residents on
almost any basis and to apply these new deportation rules retroactively.10 2 At the same time, the Executive has gained increasing control over the rights of migrants, especially in the form of enforcement
101 See supra notes 32-34.
102 See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954) (upholding retroactive application
of deportation provisions of Subversive Activity Control Act); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 721-22 (1893) (holding that federal government has broad power to
deport any noncitizen); see also Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-546 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (making many retroactive changes to grounds of
deportability); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314-26 (2001) (discussing IIRIRA's retroactive
application).
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actions against migrants who have entered illegally. 10 3 Thus, the
strength of migrant rights in the United States varies according to the
type of migrant and the type of right in question, and, as our model
predicts, the rights of short-term migrants are weaker-that is, easier
to change.
To sum up, migration policy presents a precommitment problem
for the host country. The host country seeks to encourage migrants to
enter and make country-specific investments so that it can obtain
greater tax revenues and other benefits. At the same time, the host
country has a strong interest in being able to remove migrants, or significantly reduce the quality of their living circumstances, ex post.
If the content of rights could be perfectly specified in advanceso that the host country could take adverse actions against migrants if
and only if doing so was socially optimal for citizens from an ex ante
perspective-then the rights should be the strongest possible. But
because rights cannot be perfectly specified in advance, the host
country faces a second-order trade-off between granting weak rights
(so that it can change them at will but with the result that migrants
will be reluctant to invest) and strong rights (so that migrants will
invest but the host country will not be able to change those rights
when doing so is optimal).
We can again offer some predictions. When verification costs are
low so that host countries can offer detailed contracts that specify
migrant rights under different conditions, the strength of rights should
be high. When verification costs are high, however, host countries will
offer stronger rights (for example, statutory rather than administrative) to migrants who make optimal country-specific investments than
to migrants who do not. In the United States, skilled workers who
enter on visas have statutory rights while unskilled workers who enter
illegally have quasi-administrative rights that exist at the sufferance of
the executive. 1°4
III
COMPLICATIONS

We just outlined a basic model with potentially testable predictions. The real world is more complex, however, and here we suggest
some ways for complicating the analysis.
See Cox & Posner, supra note 10, at 852.
See id. at 849-52 (discussing de facto low-rights system of illegal entry); Cox &
Rodrfguez, supra note 98, at 63-65 (arguing that Executive has broad and unilateral
powers over illegal immigrants).
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A.

Exit Rights

All migrants have the right to exit. In our basic model, this right
is irrelevant because the problem on which we focus is that of the
precommitment of the host country. But one can imagine the opposite problem, namely, that countries fear that if they welcome
migrants and incur costs in training, educating, and assimilating them
(for example, by offering bilingual programs in schools), the migrants
may leave the country before working and paying enough taxes to
allow the host country to recover its investment.
If this problem were real, host countries could deny migrants the
right to exit or require migrants to post a bond before they enter,
which they would lose if they voluntarily left the country before a
specified period of time had expired. In practice, no modern democracy formally limits migrants' (or citizens') exit rights, and we do not
observe the bonding system. 10 5 This suggests that the problem is theoretical rather than real. Nonetheless, some countries do require
migrants to repudiate their citizenship in other countries before
accepting citizenship in the host country.10 6 This requirement reduces
the value of the exit option, as the exiting migrant would need to
reapply for citizenship in her native country or go elsewhere. We will
discuss dual citizenship in greater detail in Part IV.B.
If migrants have the right to exit, the value of that right varies
greatly depending on the nature of the migrant and the country of
origin. Migrants from high-wage countries have more valuable exit
rights than migrants from low-wage countries because the latter lose
more future income if they leave the host country. Refugees also have
higher exit costs: If they return to their native country, they may be
harassed or killed. One might predict that host countries would offer
weaker rights to migrants with low-value exit options because the host
105 To be clear, by "exit rights" we mean the legal right of the immigrant to return to her
home country. There are many other reasons that noncitizens might physically exit the
host country: They might travel abroad on vacation, or they might travel back to their
home country to visit family and friends. These forms of temporary travel abroad do not
raise the concerns we focus on in this section. But we should note that the United States
does, as a functional matter, impose some restrictions on these travel rights. See Nancy
Morawetz, The Invisible Border: Restrictions on Short-Term Travel by Noncitizens, 21
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 201, 205-19 (2007) (describing current travel restrictions imposed on
LPRs and applicants).
106 See Patrick Weil, Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-five Nationality
Laws, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 17, 22-24 (T.
Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2001) (listing European countries that
have renunciation requirement); Simone Tan, Note, Dual Nationality in France and the
United States, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 447, 461-62 (1992) (noting that
France's Nationality Act of 1973 departed from Code of 1945's requirement that French
citizenship must be abandoned upon acquiring citizenship of another state).
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country need not fear that such migrants will leave if they are treated
poorly and thus can depend on these migrants to make countryspecific investments despite fewer and weaker rights. One observes
this pattern of regulation in the United States, where high-skilled
workers from prosperous nations in Europe and elsewhere are often
accorded substantial legal rights, while low-skilled workers from much
poorer nations in Central and South America are admitted on restrictive terms or permitted to enter without any legal status at all. 107
B.

Families

Our basic theory assumed just two agents: a monolithic state and
a solitary migrant. But migrants are seldom solitary. States can
encourage migrants to enter and invest by promising rights to family
members, such as children. As before, however, the state risks tying
its hands in a way that may hurt it ex post.
Sending and Receiving States face similar choices with respect to
the treatment of family members. A migrant may have any number of
familial relationships, current (as of the time of migration) and prospective (after migration). Let us distinguish a few dimensions. First,
at the time of arrival, the migrant may have many or few relatives,
each of whom may be close or distant. Second, she may bring these
relatives (some or all) with her or they may stay in the Sending State.
Third, she may establish new familial relationships in the Receiving
State-in particular, a spouse and children (but also in-laws, nephews,
nieces, and so forth). Fourth, her new relations may have stronger or
weaker connections with the Receiving State (they might be noncitizens, for example). The Sending and Receiving States must make
numerous choices about how to treat these familial relations and,
therefore, about how to treat the migrant herself, given that the
migrant will care about maintaining these relationships and (usually)
staying in proximity to her family.
We can speak broadly of favorable family policies or unfavorable
family policies, where the degree of favor refers to the extent to which
the migrant may exercise an option to enter with pre-entry family connections and to exit with post-entry family connections. To keep
things simple, however, let us focus on perhaps the most important
issue from the standpoint of policy: the rights of children.
107 See Cox & Posner, supra note 10, at 849 (describing "multi-'track' structure of
American immigration law"). Refugees are an exception in the United States. They are
formally provided generous rights, including legal status and the right to eventually
become LPRs. See INA §§ 208-209, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-1159 (2006) (describing asylum
requirements and legal rights of noncitizens granted asylum).
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Consider a migrant who enters a Receiving State and then has a
child while in that country's territory. The basic conceptual divide is
between jus sanguinis and jus soli.108 Jus sanguinis provides that a

child derives her citizenship from her parents, so a child of German
citizens who is born in the United States has German citizenship. 10 9
Jus soli provides that the child derives her citizenship from the state in
whose territory she is born, so the child in our example would have
United States citizenship. 110 Actual laws deviate from these paradigms, and various rules resolve conflicts or permit dual citizenship,
but we will limit ourselves to the paradigm cases.1 1 '
What are the costs and benefits of the two systems? For the

migrant, a host country with jus soli is more attractive than a country
with jus sanguinis because only in the former can her child, if born in
the Receiving State, have Receiving-State citizenship. Given that a
child who is born and spends several years in the Receiving State will
generally be a fluent speaker of that language and may have trouble

learning the language of the Sending State, the migrant's interest in
obtaining citizenship for her child may be strong. To be sure, this citizenship might not be worth anything if the migrant and her children

leave the Receiving State. Even in that case, the option to return has
value because it protects the migrant from adverse developments in
her home country. 112 But, compared to jus sanguinis,jus soli gives the

migrant the option to obtain citizenship for her children if she decides
to remain permanently in the Receiving State, so that her children, as
adults, may stay as well.
At the same time, the migrant will prefer to have a system of jus
sanguinis in the Sending State. This ensures that if she decides to
return, then her children will be able to return with her and reside
3
permanently as citizens of the Sending State.11
108 Weil, supra note 106, at 17.
109 RUTH DONNER, THE REGULATION OF NATIONALITY

IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-33

(2d ed. 1994).
110 Id.
111 We discuss the variations in citizenship rules more fully in Part IV.B infra.
112 In theory, the children's citizenship in the Receiving State may be limited by Sending
State rules. For example, the Sending State could confer citizenship on the child under
principles of jus sanguinis and refuse to recognize the citizenship conferred by the host
country. In practice, however, we do not observe such restrictions.
113 This point applies with diminishing force as generations pass. The migrant probably
thinks very little about the rights of her great- or great-great-grandchildren. Many statesincluding the United States-have a generational cutoff. See, e.g., INA § 301, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401 (2006) (limiting citizenship outside of United States to those who have American
parent). But a state is less likely to have such a cutoff if it identifies strongly as a diaspora
nation founded on a shared ethnic or religious identity. Such states will want to extend
citizenship even to the remote descendants of citizens in order to encourage their entry. In
that light, it is unsurprising that Israel permits distant descendants of citizens to enter the
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Consider now the Receiving State's perspective. With respect to
immigrants, it encourages immigration and country-specific investment by adopting jus soli. Immigrants are more likely to enter, and to
invest in country-specific assets, if they expect that the children whom
they bear in the Receiving State will be citizens. There is some evidence that the United States adopted a jus soli regime in part for
these reasons-it was a fledgling nation with vast tracts of land and a
strong interest in attracting labor. 114
The cost of jus soli is that these children will have voting rights
and the right to remain. Often this cost is very low. The children of
immigrants tend to easily learn the language of the Receiving State
and adopt the values and absorb the culture of the people who live
there. However, in countries where assimilation is difficult, the cost
could be very high. The Receiving State might fear that descendents
of migrants will form an unassimilated and hostile group; and if the
group has voting power, it may distort political outcomes away from
what is preferred by native citizens and their descendents.
If the Receiving State fears such an outcome, it will prefer jus
sanguinis,even though jus sanguinis will deter immigration. Indeed, if
jus sanguinis laws do not deter immigration, they can create a selffulfilling prophecy where migrants teach their children the language,
culture, and values of the migrants' country of origin so that the children will have a viable exit option, in which case these children may
not learn the Receiving State's language, culture, and values well
enough to allow them to fully assimilate. It may not be a coincidence
that jus soli prevails in the United States, which has a successful history of assimilation, while jus sanguinis has historically prevailed in
European countries such as Germany and France, which have unassimilated national minorities. This said, the direction of causality is
unclear. 115
The Sending State can choose to benefit the emigrant by creating
a system of jus sanguinis. If jus soli prevails, the emigrant's foreignborn children will not have their parent's country-of-origin citizenship.
This lowers the value of the emigrant's option to exit the Receiving
State. By contrast, if jus sanguinis prevails in the Sending State, the
country and quickly become Israeli citizens. See Yousef T. Jabareen, Constitution Building
and Equality in Deeply-Divided Societies: The Case of the Palestinian-Arab Minority in
Israel,26 Wis. INT'L L.J. 345, 368-69 (2008) (detailing Israel's Law of Return, 5710-1950, 4
LSI 114 (1949-50) (Isr.), Nationality Law, 5712-1952, 6 LSI 50 (1951-52) (Isr.), and Entry
into Israel Law 1952 5712-1952, 6 LSI 159 (1951-52) (Isr.)).
114 Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8-9
(1984).
115 See Weil, supra note 106, at 19-25 (describing this historical pattern).
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emigrant can be sure that her children will be citizens in that state.
Thus, the Sending State might use a system of jus sanguinis to
encourage emigration and jus soli to discourage emigration.
However, it should be clear that states need not have the same
system for emigrants and immigrants. A country that seeks to
encourage both immigration and emigration, for example, could have
jus soli for immigrants and jus sanguinis for emigrants. This is, in fact,
close to the practical effect of United States citizenship policy, which
116
combines elements of both jus soli and jus sanguinis.
Various rules can also be used to soften the edges of the paradigm
regimes. A jus soli state, for example, might allow a returning migrant
to obtain citizenship status for children born overseas with lesser hurdles, such as shortening waiting periods, lowering fees, and so forth.
And, indeed, since World War II, countries with historically different
migration law traditions have been gradually converging toward a
1 17
system that combines elements of jus soli and jus sanguinis.
Our point, for now, is that what one might call "child-citizenship
rights"-jussoli, ]us sanguinis, and the variations-are similar to basic
rights, participation rights, and the right to remain, but with an additional twist. Like the other rights, child-citizenship rights are used by
the Receiving State to attract migrants and encourage investment, and
granting these rights will be particularly favored by the Receiving
State when assimilation can be expected. The twist is that childcitizenship rights can also be used by the Sending State to increase or
reduce the value of the exit option of its citizens living in foreign
states.
C.

Voting Rights

Our simple model above assumed that the cost to the Receiving
State of political participation by migrants stemmed exclusively from
their potentially divergent preferences. The truth is more complicated. From the Receiving State's perspective, there are several different reasons why it might be costly to extend voting rights to
migrants.
Consider first the problems of information and inculcation. The
host country might worry that voters need certain information to cast
intelligent ballots; without that information voters might vote in ways
that are detrimental to the state and perhaps even to themselves. The
concern is that new immigrants do not have sufficient information.
116 See ALEMIKOFF ET AL., supra note 26, at 15-55 (describing elements of jus soli and
jus sanguinis traditions in U.S. law).
117 See Weil, supra note 106, at 25-32 (describing recent convergence of laws).
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The inculcation issue is related: The state might worry that new immigrants will vote in ways detrimental to the existing polity because they
will initially not have absorbed the values of the existing community.
Both of these concerns track parallel arguments in American
voting rights jurisprudence. As recently as the 1960s, several states
(and some local governments) had durational residency requirements
for voting. 118 New residents were ineligible to vote until they had
resided in the state for a fixed period, sometimes up to one year.
When these laws were challenged in court, the states defended them
on information and inculcation grounds. These arguments were
squarely rejected by the Supreme Court. 119 But the Court did not
suggest they were implausible. Instead, it concluded as a normative
matter that demanding inculcation was impermissible where interlocal or interstate, rather than international, migration was at stake.1 20
The informational and inculcation issues are both transitional
concerns. They suggest that the cost of conferring political rights on a
migrant might decline over time. If these were the only costs, they
could be alleviated through durational residency requirements-such
as the current five-year-residency requirement prior to naturalization-or by other mechanisms designed to lower information costs or
to reshape migrants' preferences.
But even if migrants all had good information and fixed preferences, the Receiving State might worry that those preferences
diverged from the existing polity in a way that imposed costs on the
state. Importantly, however, this does not mean that the Receiving
State need always strive to pick migrants with political preferences
close to those of existing citizens.
If politics is driven by the median voter, for example, then the
state need only ensure that extending voting rights to migrants does
not move the median. The Receiving State could accomplish this in
one of two ways. First, it could grant voting rights only to migrants
whose preferences are close to that of the existing median voter.
Second, it could extend the franchise to migrants with diverse preferFor example, the Tennessee Constitution stated that
[e]very person of the age of twenty-one years, being a citizen of the United
States, and a resident of this State for twelve months, and of the county
wherein such person may offer to vote for three months, next preceding the
day of election, shall be entitled to vote for . . . members of the General
Assembly and other civil officers for the county or district in which such
person resides ....
TENN. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1970), invalidated by Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
119 See generally Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
120 See Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 357-60 (implicitly rejecting state's attempts to enforce
requirement that electorate be informed).
118
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ences, so long as it ensured that these migrants' preferences were distributed roughly equally around the median preference of the existing
polity.
On this account, the cost of migrant voting is a function of the
median migrant's voting preferences but not of the overall diversity of
migrants' views.12 Homogeneity itself is relatively unimportant-and
can actually increase the cost of error for the state if it misjudges the
122
preferences of the migrants it picks.
On a related note, it is not just migrant voters' preferences that
will concern the Receiving State. Governments are powerful agents
of redistribution. This raises the concern that migrants-even
migrants who have ideological preferences identical to existing citizens-might try to use their political power to redistribute the state's

wealth to themselves. If this is the state's central concern, then it will
worry more about the organizational capacities of the immigrant pool
than about their ideological distribution. Migrants who can more
easily overcome collective action problems and band together as a
12 3
group will be more likely to engage in successful rent seeking.
Shared cultural, ethnic, or linguistic identity might be features
that facilitate such collective action. Consider, for example, the
Cuban immigrant community, whose political power has been widely
documented. 124 Thus, a state concerned most about rent seeking

121 As a technical matter, the cost is also a function of the size of the migrant pool. If
the median migrant's preferences diverge from the existing electorate, the extent to which
this will actually shift the Receiving State's policies depends on the relative size of the
existing polity and the pool of potential migrant voters.
122 There are, however, other theories that imply that the Receiving State might favor
homogeneity in the electorate. Governments produce public goods. A trope of localgovernment literature is that the efficiency of public good production can be improved by
increasing the homogeneity of the electorate. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcoN. 416, 418-20 (1956) (modeling supply of local public
goods). This can be true where there are economies of scale associated with public good
production, or where supplying one public good interferes with supplying another, which
could be true because the goods themselves are in conflict, as with open spaces and highways, or because the production of public goods is costly, and the government is fiscally
constrained. If the efficient supply of public goods were all one cared about, then one
would want to use immigration law to increase the homogeneity of the electorate. While
this might be a plausible account for very small states, it seems implausible for a large and
diverse state like the United States.
123 See generally MANCUR OLSON, TiE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971) (describing conditions that facilitate and inhibit col-

lective actions).
124 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right To Vote, 44 EMORY L.J. 869, 898
(1995) (discussing Cuban-American political power in Florida).
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might try to limit large-scale migrations from a single source and to
5
pick migrants with diverse ethnic and linguistic backgrounds.12
As should be clear from the examples above, different theories
about the structure and function of democracy lead to quite different,
often conflicting, prescriptions. For example, a government concerned about producing public goods efficiently might favor a homogeneous migrant pool, but a homogeneous migrant pool is the last
thing a government concerned about rent seeking would want.
Understanding more fully the political implications of immigration policy highlights a potential tension in a state's immigrantselection system. States select immigrants along several dimensions.
Labor is one important dimension: States often select immigrants
who promote particular labor market goals. In the United States
today, this might mean admitting a large number of low-skilled
workers. But the state's selection preferences regarding the labor
market might conflict with the state's ideological selection preferences. 126 Low-skilled workers might turn out to have ideological
preferences far from those of the existing electorate. Where this is
true, the state must either compromise along one of these dimensions
or attempt to avoid the compromise by admitting the immigrants
while excluding them from participation in the political process. 127
This trade-off might help explain why the United States today is
contemplating the use of temporary migration programs (which really
means a slow path to permanent residence and eventual voting) for
low-skilled workers but a much quicker path for high-skilled workers.
The comprehensive reform legislation that failed to make it out of
Congress in 2006 reflected this structure. 128 Several versions of that
legislation combined a large increase in the green-card quota for highskilled workers with the creation of a large-scale temporary worker
125 The United States's quota system includes some such limits. Per-country caps limit
the number of migrants from each Sending State who may receive visas. For most states
these restrictions are irrelevant, but they impose tremendous restrictions on migration
from places like Mexico and the Philippines. See INA § 202, 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006) (setting per-country caps); see also ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 26, at 308-11 (describing
per-country caps and effect they have on China, India, Mexico, and Philippines); 9 U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, VISA BULL. No. 4, at A.5 (2009), http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/
bulletin_4406.html (showing current backlogs created by caps).
126 See generally Francesc Ortega, Immigration Quotas and Skill Upgrading, 89 J. Pun.
ECON. 1841 (2004) (modeling trade-off between labor and electoral effects of migration).
127 This also suggests that, on the margin, states will be more likely to try to attract
ideologically dissimilar immigrants with other forms of protection, such as a stronger right
to remain.
128 Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. tits. IV, V
(2006).
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program for low-skilled workers. 129 The high-skilled workers given
green cards and admitted as LPRs would have been eligible to naturalize in five years. 130 In contrast, the low-skilled workers would have
had to work for at least three years (and typically longer) before
becoming eligible to apply for lawful permanent residence, and their
applications would be further delayed if they were unable to pass
English and civics exams from which the high-skilled migrants were
exempt. 3 1 This would mean that low-skilled workers would have to
wait nearly twice as long as high-skilled workers (under the best of
circumstances) to obtain political rights. One explanation of this differential treatment is that the government believed that high-skilled
workers would be more likely-because of their countries of origin
and high levels of education, among other reasons-to have ideological preferences closer to those of the existing U.S. electorate.
The European Union (EU) presents another interesting example.
Article 19 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC)
gives every citizen of the EU the right to vote in municipal elections
wherever she is a resident. 132 A Pole living in Paris can thus vote in
Paris's mayoral elections. But, she cannot vote in French parliamentary or presidential elections. The rules clearly reflect the EU's goal
of European integration-to strengthen incentives for workers to
move to places where their labor is most highly valued. The EC
Treaty increases the migrant's incentive to make country-specific
investments by giving her the ability to form political coalitions that
can block policies that harm her. At the same time, the rules implicitly recognize that foreigners do not share all of the values and interests of nationals, and hence the rules limit the ability of foreigners to
affect policy by depriving them of the vote at the national level.
D.

The Role of Employers

As noted above, many U.S. employment visas permit the migrant
to enter only with the sponsorship of an employer. The migrant can
remain in the country only as long as she continues to work for that
129 See id. tit. V (raising employment quota that goes mostly to high-skilled workers
from 150,000 to 450,000 per year and altering diversity lottery to promote entry of even
more high-skilled LPRs); id. tit. IV (establishing H-2C temporary worker program for lowskilled workers).
130 See INA § 316, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2006) (requiring five years of residence prior to
naturalization).
131 See S. 2611 tit. VI (providing eventual path to LPR status through self-petition or
through existing visa applications).
132 Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 19, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J.
(C 325) 33, 45.
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employer. 133 This feature of the law gives the employer a great deal
of bargaining power and makes the migrant vulnerable to holdup-a
threat to terminate the migrant unless she accepts lower pay-and
134
other forms of opportunism.
As a consequence, at the margin, the migrant will make
employer-specific investments-investments in employer-related skills
whose cost can be recovered only through employment-rather than
country-specific investments. The reason is that the migrant can
recover the costs of her investments only by remaining with the
employer. From the perspective of the host country, this arrangement
may not be ideal. The host country benefits more from countryspecific investments than from employer-specific investments. At the
margin, the migrant may invest more in employer-related skills than in
learning the cultural norms of the country. For example, an Englishspeaking German migrant in France, working for a firm where the
working language is English, may not bother to learn French, preferring to improve his English.
A further consideration is that migrants may be hesitant about
entering a country and making country- and employer-specific investments if the employer has so much bargaining power. The employer
has a strong ex post incentive to hold up the migrant, forcing her to
choose between low wages that do not cover her ex ante investments
135
or returning to her native country where her wages are even lower.
To attract migrants who are hesitant for these reasons, employers
would need to establish a reputation for fair ex post treatment or
agree to contractual obligations along the same lines.

133 See INA §§ 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b), 214, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b), 1184 (2006)
(describing requirements for H-2B agricultural workers, whose status is dependent on
employment by firm that sponsors them); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h) (2009) (same). Some
employment visas permit migrants to change jobs but make it cumbersome to do so,
thereby limiting labor market mobility as a practical matter. See, e.g., INA § 214(n), 8
U.S.C. § 1184(n) (H-1B portability provision).
134 See NGAI, supra note 76, at 139-44 (criticizing Bracero program on these grounds);
see also CINDY HAHAMOVITCH, THE FRUrrS OF THEIR LABOR: ATLANTIC COAST
FARMWORKERS AND THE MAKING OF MIGRANT POVERTY, 1870-1945, at 168-81 (1997)

(describing agricultural employers' historic preference for migrant workers, whose easy
deportability led to reduced bargaining power).
135 Historically, this has been a significant problem in the United States. See NGAI,
supra note 76, at 138-47 (describing conditions during Bracero Program that made
Mexican agricultural workers vulnerable to their employers). Today, it is often a principal
objection to those who oppose the creation of larger temporary worker programs, particularly for low-skilled workers. See Cristina M. Rodrfguez, Guest Workers and Integration:
Toward a Theory of What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 219, 270 (explaining guest worker vulnerability to sponsoring employer).
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E.

Internal Political Economy

Up to this point, we have assumed that the state is a monolithic
entity that steadfastly pursues the interests of its native citizens. This
simplification helps highlight some important dynamics, but it
obscures the internal political economy of the state. Decisions about
which migrants to admit and whether (or how quickly) to confer
voting rights on them are themselves the product of the existing polit1 36
ical process.

Perhaps the most important possibility is that insiders will use
immigration policy to try to lock themselves in power. They might
attempt to do this in several ways. First, they might do so by keeping
out migrants with different electoral preferences, or about whom
there is more uncertainty as to their preferences. These migrants
might be excluded at the border, or the state might admit them but
either deny them voting rights or delay their access to the franchise.
This could be accomplished by making migrants ineligible for citizenship or by requiring a longer period of residence before the migrants
were eligible for citizenship. Second, this dynamic could operate in
reverse, with political insiders encouraging immigration by potential
supporters and speeding their access to the franchise (by, for example,
shortening the naturalization period or granting voting rights prior to
naturalization). A third possibility is that political insiders would
encourage emigration by political opponents, either by deporting
them or by making their day-to-day lives much less comfortable.
The third possibility seems unlikely in the United States because
all voters in national elections today are citizens, and the Constitution
prohibits the deportation of citizens. 137 Furthermore, the cost of exit
for citizens is often high. Thus, it is hard to imagine the state successfully encouraging or coercing voters to leave by making their lives
more difficult. That said, there is some evidence that this strategy has
been used at the local level. 138 And the deportation provision in the
136 In this sense, there is an important and overlooked parallel between immigration law
and the law of democracy: Both contain a basic endogeneity because the legal rules regulate the boundaries that determine who will participate in the setting of future legal rules.
This endogeneity is a central theme of modern voting rights scholarship. But it is largely
ignored by immigration scholars.
137 See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (holding that Constitution guarantees
citizen's right to retain citizenship unless voluntarily relinquished); see also supra text
accompanying note 18 (explaining that citizens have right not to be exiled).
138 One prominent example is James Michael Curley, the Irish American mayor of
Boston, who over decades contributed to the dramatic depopulation of the city's AngloProtestant citizens through "aggressive redistribution and incendiary rhetoric." Edward L.
Glaeser & Andrei Schleifer, The Curley Effect: The Economics of Shaping the Electorate,
21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 1-2, 9-12 (2005).
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1798 Alien and Sedition Act shows that the possibility is not unheard
139
of at the national level.
The first possibility seems considerably more plausible. In fact,
some historical episodes in America are consistent with this account.
Consider, for example, the rapid changes made to U.S. naturalization
rules in the period immediately following the ratification of the Constitution. Over the course of a few short years in the 1790s, Congress
sharply expanded the durational residency requirement for naturalization-first from two to five years, and then from five to fourteen
years. 140 These changes had the effect of keeping some new migrants
out of the voting booth for lengthy periods of time by delaying access
to citizenship, and even in situations where citizenship was not
required for voting, it precluded office holding by migrants. Many historians have argued that these early changes to naturalization law
were in part the product of a fight between nascent American political
parties-an attempt by the emerging Federalist Party to keep the government out of the hands of the Jeffersonians, whom many Federalists
14
feared were associated with radical pro-French immigrants. '
Since the Alien and Sedition Act episode, the naturalization
delay has been stable in blackletter American immigration law.
Lawful permanent residents have for the last 200 years been required
to live in the United States for five years before becoming eligible to
naturalize. 42 Thus, it is tempting to conclude that durational residency requirements have not been used to shape the composition of
the electorate. 143
139 Alien Friends Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, 570-71 (1798) (authorizing President to deport
noncitizens considered "dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States").
140 See Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 103 (establishing requirement of
two years residence before naturalization); Naturalization Act of 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414,
414 (extending required residency period to five years); Naturalization Act of 1798, ch. 54,
1 Stat. 566, 566 (1798) (extending residency period to fourteen years); Act of Apr. 14, 1802,
ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153, 153 (1802) (returning residency period to five years).
141 E.g., STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC McKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 590 (1993)
(discussing Federalists' efforts to make naturalization harder and prevent noncitizens from
voting because of fears that "inordinate numbers of [noncitizens] seemed disposed to support the Republican party"); SEAN WILENTz, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY:
JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 78 (2005).
142 See 2 Stat. 153; INA § 316, 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (2006).
143 Note that this claim implicitly assumes that voting rights follow automatically from
naturalization. In the nineteenth century, however, the right to vote was not so closely
associated with the concept of citizenship. See supra text accompanying notes 47-52.
Thus, in that period it was thinkable to have a separate sort of durational residency
requirement for voting. During the 1850s, the anti-immigrant Know Nothings advocated a
fourteen- or even twenty-one-year post-naturalization waiting period. When they won
control of the Massachusetts government in 1854, the legislature passed a fourteen-year
waiting period. While it failed to become law because of the complex rules for amending
the Massachusetts Constitution, two years later a coalition of Know Nothings and Republi-

Reprinted with permission of New York University School of Law
HeinOnline -- 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1448 2009

December 2009]

THE RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS

But there are a few important exceptions. First, well into the
twentieth century, immigrants from Asia were ineligible to naturalize
because of racial bias in the naturalization rules.14 4 Second, while the

formal residency rule has remained fixed, other changes to U.S. immigration law have created considerable variation in practice. Much of

that variation is the product of changes in who falls into the legal category of LPR. In the nineteenth century, basically all immigrants fell
into this category. 145 But the twentieth century brought the growth of

two new groups: temporary migrants, who were entitled to enter for
fixed periods of time, and so-called illegal immigrants, who were not
146
legally entitled to reside in the country.
It might seem like a mistake to call members of these groups

migrants, as they are not formally on the path to citizenship. But in
practice, they often are. Modern immigration law sometimes offers

temporary immigrants the option, after some period of time, to
become LPRs. For such migrants, the effect of their initially "temporary" admission is simply to lengthen the period of residence required
before naturalization. 147 Relatedly, unauthorized migrants have
sometimes been provided the opportunity to become LPRs (through
periodic legalizations, the Immigration and Nationality Act's cancellation of removal provisions, etc.) and eventually citizens. 148 But as a
cans enacted into law a compromise that prohibited newly minted citizens from voting for
the first two years following naturalization. KEYSSAR, supra note 15, at 86; 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF U.S. LABOR AND WORKING-CLASS HISTORY 750 (Eric Arnesen ed., 2007).
144 See Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 373,
404 (2004) (outlining racial restrictions on naturalization, some of which remained until
1952).
145 This statement is accurate for our purposes here, but we should note that it is a
simplification. In fact, it is anachronistic to talk about the category of "lawful permanent
residents" in nineteenth century America. There was no need to categorize some migrants
as "permanent" until categories of "temporary" immigrants were first created by
American immigration law in the early part of the twentieth century. See An Act To
Regulate the Immigration of Aliens to, and the Residence of Aliens in, the United States,
ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 878 (1917) (authorizing rules to "control and regulate the admission
and return of otherwise inadmissible aliens applying for temporary admission"); An Act To
Limit the Immigration of Aliens into the United States, Pub. L. 67-5, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5, 5
(1921) (establishing first immigration quotas in American history, but excepting certain
noncitizens, including some temporary workers, from quota).
146 See INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2006) (describing categories of "nonimmigrants"). See generally NGAI, supra note 76 (describing creation of category of illegal
aliens).
147 See, e.g., ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 26, at 437-38 (describing transitional status
of many formally "temporary" immigrants); see also American Competitiveness in the
Twenty-first Century Act, Pub. L. No. 106-313, § 105, 114 Stat. 1253 (2000) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1184(n) (2006)) (recognizing transitional status of many who enter initially on H1B nonimmigrant visas).
148 See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 201, 100
Stat. 3359, 3394 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a) (2006)) (creating legalization program
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practical matter these immigrants face a much longer naturalization
delay than those initially admitted as LPRs. These rules provide possible examples of attempts by political insiders to protect themselves
from political pressures coming from recently arrived migrants with
149
interests different from those of the insiders' constituents.
While this highlights the costs that can flow from a lag between
admission and the acquisition of voting rights, the delay has a potential upside as well. Legal rules that delay immigrant access to the
franchise (and that make it difficult for insiders to change those rules)
can lessen the likelihood that insiders will attempt to manipulate
immigration policy to advance their own political interests. They do
so in two ways. First, the delay makes it more difficult for insiders to
predict the electoral preferences of immigrants admitted under the
system. Their preferences may be well known at the time of entry, but
there will be considerably more uncertainty about what those preferences will look like years down the road when the migrants gain the
right to vote. In this way, lags in naturalization operate somewhat as a
150
temporal veil of ignorance.
Second, the delay may reduce the incentive of political insiders to
manipulate the immigration rules in self-interested ways. This is
because political insiders likely have limited time horizons. While
political parties may lower politicians' discount rates to a certain
extent, politicians are still less likely to care as much about elections
several electoral cycles in the future than they do about the next few
election cycles. Thus, lags in naturalization may have a salutary effect
on the political economy of migration policy.151
under which more than two million illegal immigrants obtained green cards); INA § 240A,
8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006) (providing, through "cancellation of removal," mechanism for
small number of unlawful immigrants who satisfy number of criteria to become LPRs);
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. tit. VI (2006) (creating large-scale legalization program).
149 Putting aside durational residency requirements, the basic task of processing applications for citizenship provides additional opportunities for incumbency entrenchment and
partisan manipulation. Indeed, during the 2008 presidential elections, there were claims
that the executive branch was delaying naturalizations in order to keep LPRs thought to be
sympathetic to the Democratic Party from becoming citizens before the election. See, e.g.,
Tom Curry, Parties Wrangle over Election-Year Citizenship, July 1, 2008, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25446136/. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these claims were the exact
opposite of claims made by Republicans in 1996, who contended that the Clinton administration rushed through naturalizations on the eve of the presidential election. Id.
150 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-23 (rev. ed. 1999) (developing
idea of veil of ignorance); Adam B. Cox, Commentary, PartisanFairnessand Redistricting
Politics,79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 751, 770 & n.70 (2004) (discussing use of temporal veil of ignorance in design of electoral rules).
151 See Adam B. Cox, Designing RedistrictingInstitutions, 5 ELECTION L.J. 412, 418-21
(2006) (explaining that deferred implementation creates partial temporal veil of ignorance
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Focusing on the political rights of migrants makes clear that the
political economy of migration policy is more complicated than is
often assumed. Consider policies concerning wealth redistribution.
There is a large literature on the ways in which immigration and redistributive policies interact. The bulk of this scholarship focuses on the
fiscal consequences of migrants-on whether they will be net payers
or receivers in the system. 152 But the above discussion shows that
such an approach is incomplete because unless migrants are excluded
indefinitely from the political process, immigration policy will affect
the composition of the electorate voting on such policies in the
153
future.
There is some historical evidence that support for immigration is
affected by related sorts of interest-group dynamics. Consider
Claudia Goldin's study of immigration restrictionism during the first
two decades of the twentieth century. 154 The study highlights the role
immigrants themselves can play in the political economy of immigration legislation. From the mid-1890s until the passage of the National
Origins Quota Act in 1921, anti-immigrant forces tried to close the
door to immigrants. On several occasions, Congress passed restrictive
literacy requirements that were vetoed by the President. Twice, the
House managed to override the presidential veto, but until 1917 the
two chambers could not together muster the votes needed to write the
literacy requirement into law.
Goldin shows that the political power of the immigrants themselves was a central reason why it took restrictionist forces twenty
years to succeed. Examining city-level data, she finds that increases in
the percentage of foreign-born in a city initially raised the likelihood
that the city's representatives in Congress would vote in a restrictionist direction. Her theory is that increasing the immigrant
that could make legislators less likely to use political process to pursue their political selfinterest).
152 See GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN'S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY 121-22 (1999) (surveying research on this question).
153 For a few early attempts to grapple with this problem, see, for example, Jess
Benhabib, On the Political Economy of Immigration, 40 EUR. ECON. REv. 1737 (1996);
Edith Sand & Assaf Razin, The Role of Immigration in Sustaining the Social Security
System: A Political Economy Approach 17-18 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 1979, 2007).
For a more general attempt to model situations in which current policy choices (such as
immigration policy) affect the future distribution of political power, see Jinhui H. Bai &
Roger Lagunoff, On the Faustian Dynamics of Policy and Political Power (Geo. U. Dep't
Econ., Working Paper No. Gueconwpa-08-08-02, 2008), available at http://ideas.repec.org/
p/geo/guwopa/gueconwpa-08-08-02.html.
154 Claudia Goldin, The Political Economy of Immigration Restriction in the United
States, 1890 to 1921, in THE REGULATED ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL ECONOMY 223 (Claudia Goldin & Gary D. Libecap eds., 1994).
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workforce depressed wage growth and produced a backlash among
native voters. But once the foreign-born fractions reached a certain
level-about thirty percent of the city's total population-almost all
representatives voted against restriction. 155 For her, this finding
"underscores the critical importance of reinforcing flows of immigration in building and maintaining the open immigrant vote" 156 during
the early part of the twentieth century.
Goldin's work, along with the recent work on immigration and
welfare policy, 157 highlights the twin concerns a state might have
about conferring political rights on migrants: first, that the migrants
will change the sorts of public goods that the state provides; second,
that they will affect the state's immigration policy itself. These twin
concerns point to an overlooked design possibility: Migrants could be
given voting rights with respect to one set of policies but not the other.
This might initially seem implausible, because we generally do not
think about extending the franchise in issue-specific ways. But it is
important to realize that the most prominent contemporary proposals
concerning noncitizen voting actually do embody this sort of
separation.
Today, advocates of noncitizen voting argue most vociferously for
local rather than national voting rights. 158 The argument for local
voting is usually cast in the language of membership and obligation.
The claim is that noncitizens truly are "members" of their local community, such that they deserve local voting rights, even though they
are not yet full members of the national community. 159 But our
approach suggests a different argument for local but not national
voting rights, one that focuses on the types of policies at stake rather
than the membership claims of migrants. Local voting rights give
migrants more control over many of the local public goods that most
directly affect their daily lives, like public schools and zoning. But
local voting rights give them much less control over immigration
155
156

Id. at 253.

Id. at 254-55 (arguing that flows were reinforcing from 1900 to 1910 but diluting
from 1910 to 1920).
157 E.g., Benhabib, supra note 153, at 1742-43 (discussing impact of migrants on
Receiving State's immigration policy); Myers & Papageorgiou, supra note 13 (discussing
possible detrimental impact of illegal migrants on "redistributive public sector" of
Receiving State); Sand & Razin, supra note 153 (discussing impact of migrants on sustainability of social security system).
158 In fact, a smattering of local governments around the country have responded and
authorized noncitizen voting. RON HAYDUK, DEMOCRACY FOR ALL: RESTORING IMMIGRANT VOTING RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 87-107 (2006) (describing extension of
franchise to immigrants in Chicago, six towns in Maryland, and New York City).
159 E.g., id. at 54-65; Raskin, supra note 38, at 1441-45; Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and
Equal Protection: Why Not the Right To Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092, 1112-19 (1977).
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policy, which is principally made by the national government. Thus,
separating the local and national franchise for noncitizens may provide a rough and ready mechanism by which the state can give

migrants some control over policies that affect them without allowing
them to affect immigration policy itself.
IV
INTERACTION EFFEcrs

The basic model in Part II assumed that there was only one state

in the picture. In reality, multiple host states compete for migrants,
especially wealthy and highly skilled migrants. 160 Moreover, the

preferences of Sending States will often interact with Receiving State
preferences in ways that affect migrants' rights. This Part discusses
some insights that follow when we relax the single-state-actor assump-

tion of the basic migration contract model.
Before proceeding, we should address the conceptual possibility

of Sending States bargaining directly with Receiving States. In principle, all states could enter a treaty that provided for a migration
policy that would make all states better off. The treaty would provide
the terms of admission and the conditions under which states could

deport migrants or otherwise affect their way of life. Such a treaty
would protect country-specific investments by migrants and would

limit the adverse effects from competition for migrants.
Historically, such bargaining has sometimes occurred, and
migrants' rights have often turned on explicit agreements or coordina-

tion strategies between states. In eighteenth-century Europe, for
example, migrants' rights in the Receiving State were frequently
based on reciprocity with the Sending State. 161 Early United States

history reveals similar practices, with migrants' rights to own property

162
often regulated through bilateral arrangements with other nations.

160 Ayelet Shachar, The Race for Talent Highly Skilled Migrants and Competition Immigration Regimes, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148, 151 (2006).
161 See, e.g., PETER SAHLINS, UNNATURALLY FRENCH: FOREIGN CITIZENS IN THE OLD
REGIME AND AFTER 13-14, 225-35 (2004) (documenting eighteenth century growth of

agreements between France and other nations to waive, on a reciprocal basis, restrictions
on the ability of foreigners to transmit property at death).
162 There was variation in this treaty practice during the Founding period. Some bilateral treaties granted full property-holding rights to noncitizens. See, e.g., Treaty of Amity
and Commerce, U.S.-Fr., Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 12; Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.Swed., Apr. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 60; Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation (Jay Treaty),
U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116. Others granted more limited rights, requiring
that real property held by noncitizens be sold upon death. See, e.g., Treaty of Amity and
Commerce, U.S.-Prussia, July-Sept. 1785, 8 Stat. 84; Treaty of Friendship, Limits and Navigation, U.S.-Spain, art. XI, Oct. 27, 1795 8 Stat. 138. For an impressive survey of these
early American treaty provisions, which explains that much of the variation resulted from
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And later in the nineteenth century, the rights of the Chinese migrants
who sparked the first wave of restrictionist immigration policy in the
United States were the product of a treaty with China. 63 Today, such
bargaining between states is much less frequent than one might
expect.' 64 In fact, a pressing question is why capital flows and trade
are pervasively the subject of bilateral and multilateral agreements,
while migration flows are much less frequently the subject of international agreement.1 65 Nonetheless, because this question and others
concerning direct bargaining are beyond our framework, we leave
them aside for now.
A.

Labor Competition and Market Segmentation

It is a familiar idea that states compete for certain migrants, such
as those with particular skills.166 It is a less familiar idea that this competition might affect a state's design of migration rights. As we have
noted at various points, a state's optimal choice of migration policy
may depend on the policies of other states. These interactions are
sometimes obvious and sometimes not.
Suppose that a Sending State (say, India) has numerous sophisticated computer engineers who can earn higher wages in foreign states.
Imagine there is only one possible Receiving State. Employers in the
Receiving State will compete for the engineers and will offer them a
wage equal to their marginal productivity. This will, in fact, equal the
wage of native workers with the same skills, or perhaps undercut it
slightly as the market adjusts to the influx of labor. Whatever the
case, the migrant workers will likely enjoy a considerable increase in
their wage.
Founding-era disagreements about the power of the federal government to regulate a
matter traditionally controlled by state common law, see David M. Golove, Treaty-Making
and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty
Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1104-27, 1158-74, 1178 n.3 (2000).
163 See Lucy E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE

OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 9 (1995) (describing Burlingame Treaty, which
provided that Chinese immigrants in United States would be entitled to same privileges as
citizens of most favored nation).
164 Refugee treaties are the only kind of multilateral agreements relating to migration
that are common today. See, e.g., Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
165 For a recent effort to begin thinking about this puzzle, see Jennifer Gordon,
Explaining Immigration Unilateralism, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (on file
with the New York University Law Review).
166 E.g., Shachar, supra note 160, at 167-99. See generally Petra Zaletel, Competing for
the Highly Skilled Migrants: Implications for the EU Common Approach on Temporary
Economic Migration, 12 EUR. L.J. 613 (2006).
SHAPING
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Now, the employers in the Receiving State may be dissatisfied
with this regime for at least two reasons. First, suppose that the
Receiving State law provides migrants with few rights, so that
migrants make few country-specific investments. As a result, the
migrants are less valuable to the employers than they otherwise would
be. The employers might lobby the Receiving State government to
improve protections for migrants. The costs will be largely borne by
other citizens of the Receiving State, who may be unable to organize
to resist the new migration laws. It is also possible that greater protections for migrants would benefit nearly everyone (or at least not harm
anyone much).
Second, employers might try to use Receiving State laws to
cartelize the migrant labor market. Because employers must compete
for migrants, the migrants' wages will be relatively high. But suppose
that a new law allows migrants to stay in the Receiving State only as
long as they remain employed with a particular sponsoring
employer. 167 Such a rule would greatly decrease the bargaining power
of the migrants once they arrived. To be sure, such a rule would
reduce migration and also country-specific investment. But for individual employers, the gains could exceed the costs, especially since
some of the costs would be borne by others.
If, however, the number of possible Receiving States increases,
then it will be more difficult for a particular Receiving State that seeks
migrant labor to adopt laws that restrict the rights of migrant workers
once they arrive. They will, in effect, be outbid by other Receiving
States, which will provide a more appealing package of rights and
privileges to potential migrants-for example, greater flexibility to
change jobs or a quicker and more certain path to citizenship. We
might predict, then, that as the number of possible Receiving States
increases, the legal packages offered to migrants will become more
generous and uniform.
Another possibility is that market segmentation will occur. Suppose that there are two types of Receiving States: those that can
easily assimilate migrants (e.g., the United States) and those that
cannot easily assimilate migrants (e.g., Japan). It is cheaper for the
easy-assimilators to offer generous migration rights, such as a quick
path to citizenship. These packages would attract a certain type of
migrant-for example, younger people who seek to start families after
migrating. As a result, neither the Receiving State nor employers in
its territory would need to "bribe" the migrant to come by offering
167 Many U.S. employment visa categories significantly restrict job mobility. See, e.g.,
INA § 214(n), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(n) (2006).
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generous wages. By contrast, the difficult-assimilators may have to
offer financial inducements in order to compensate the migrant for
the higher risk of removal or other adverse action. In these countries,
guest- or contract-workers might be more common.
Finally, consider another interesting asymmetry: Some Receiving
States are more alike than others. A Brazilian who learns English
does not make a country-specific investment; a Brazilian who learns
Japanese does. The English-speaking Brazilian can obtain work in
any anglophone country-the United States, England, Australia, New
Zealand, Canada, etc.-as well as the numerous other countries
where English has become a lingua franca in the business world. The
Japanese-speaking Brazilian, as a practical matter, can recover the
cost of her investment in only one place: Japan. 168 All else equal,
therefore, Japan must offer migrants more generous rights than an
anglophone country in order to attract them and persuade them to
learn the language. Anglophone countries thus have immense competitive advantages in the market for migrants: They can attract many
more migrants without offering them generous rights, thus retaining
valuable flexibility.
Not all investments exhibit this interaction effect. For example,
anglophone countries may still have to offer generous rights to the
extent necessary to encourage migrants to form marital and other
emotional bonds with citizens. These investments in personal relationships are more consistently country-specific. And their existence
has important implications in light of globalization. To the extent that
globalization homogenizes some basic aspects of societies and
increases the dominance of a few languages such as English, Spanish,
and Chinese, migration will involve fewer country-specific investments, and migrants need worry less about opportunistic state
behavior. We might predict, therefore, that immigration contracts will
become more flexible in the future as the precommitment problem
becomes less severe. Yet, even in a radically globalized world, personal and social relationships will continue to be important countryspecific investments for which many migrants will demand
protection. 169

See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
This would not be true, of course, in a world where physical proximity were unimportant for these relationships. But despite the rise of social networking and a variety of other
forms of relationships in the virtual world, primacy of presence is almost certainly going to
be central to human relationships for a long time.
168
169
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B.

Dual Citizenship

Dual citizenship exists when a person is the citizen of two countries. Some nations permit dual citizenship and even citizenship in
more than two countries. Canada, France, and the United Kingdom,
170
for example, have historically been open to plural citizenship.
Other nations, such as Austria and Japan, have more restrictive
regimes. Austria requires naturalizing immigrants to expatriate themselves from their countries of origin. Japan requires those who
acquire dual citizenship at birth to choose a single nationality before
they turn twenty-two. 171 The phenomenon of dual citizenship raises
some interesting questions within our framework.
Consider an example that simplifies the law but also brings out
clearly the differences between the approaches. A person migrates
from her Sending State to a Receiving State. Under the single citizenship approach, the Receiving State grants the migrant citizenship
rights only if she renounces the citizenship of the Sending State.
Under the dual citizenship approach, the Receiving State grants the
migrant citizenship rights even if she does not renounce the citizenship of the Sending State. Note that the Sending State faces the same
choices: It can withdraw citizenship from the migrant if she accepts
Receiving State citizenship, or it can permit dual citizenship. Thus, a
person can have dual citizenship only when her Sending State and
Receiving State both permit it. How might the Receiving State and
the Sending State choose among these two approaches?
The main difference between the two approaches from the
Receiving State's perspective is that the dual citizen retains the protection of the Sending State. In practice, this protection could mean
different things. At a minimum, the migrant retains an exit optionthe option to leave the Receiving State and resettle in the Sending
State if conditions in the Receiving State turn unfavorable. 172 This
exit option is clearly more valuable than the simple right to leave that
is retained by the non-dual citizen, because she may not be able to
170 T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer, PluralNationality: Facing the Future
in a Migratory World, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES
76-77 (Aleinikoff & Klusmeyer eds., 2001).
171 Id. at 77.

172 To be sure, even for dual citizens, the exit option is often not absolute. Sending
States sometimes refuse to permit emigrants to return home, though this is most common
when they are being deported by a Receiving State. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
684-86 (2001) (describing two deportation candidates whose countries of origin refused to
repatriate). Moreover, it is sometimes not safe for an emigrant to return home. See, e.g.,
William Glaberson, Release of 17 Guantanamo Detainees Sputters as Officials Debate the

Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2008, at A20 (discussing fact that some Chinese detainees at
Guantanamo Bay faced persecution if returned to China).
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find an appealing alternative country to accept her if she chooses to
leave, and usually the Sending State, as her native land, will be her
most appealing alternative to the Receiving State. Dual citizenship
could also offer other protections. The migrant might have access to
the diplomatic protection of the Sending State. For example, if the
Receiving State violates her rights, officials of the migrant's country of
173
origin could come to her defense.
From the Sending State's perspective, allowing outgoing migrants
to retain citizenship creates obligations for the state without any
immediate benefits. The Sending State has an obligation to accept the
migrant if she returns and perhaps also to offer diplomatic aid and
protection in the Receiving State. Thus, the Sending State is more
likely to grant dual citizenship rights if it wishes to encourage emigration, or if it believes that it benefits from maintaining ties with those
of its citizens who would choose to emigrate regardless of the Sending
State's dual citizenship policy.174
From an ex ante perspective-that is, at the time of migrationthe Receiving State must weigh the competing effects of dual citizenship on country-specific investment and flexibility. A migrant who is
allowed to retain dual citizenship will have greater bargaining power
once she arrives. For example, she may be able to persuade the
Sending State to put pressure on the Receiving State if the latter is
inclined to deprive migrants of certain rights or to ignore their interests. Thus, a state may strengthen its precommitment, and hence
encourage country-specific investment, by allowing the migrant to
draw on the resources of the Sending State.
173 As a formal matter, international law may prohibit diplomatic intervention in some
such cases. See Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality
Laws, art. 4, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter 1930 Convention] ("A State may
not afford diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against a State whose nationality
such person also possesses."). But this formal rule will often not stop a citizen from
requesting state protection and will often not sop a state from coming to a citizen's aid.
Aleinikoff & Klusmeyer, supra note 170, at 73-75.
174 In recent years, a number of emigration-encouraging states in Southeast Asia,
Africa, and elsewhere have relaxed their citizenship policies to permit dual citizenship (or
sometimes dual nationality) for citizens living abroad. See Kim Barry, Home and Away:
The Construction of Citizenship in an Emigrant Context, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 11, 49-50
(2006) (discussing changes in this direction by Philippines, Turkey, and India); Eva
Ostergaard-Nielsen, International Migration and Sending Countries: Key Issues and
Themes, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND SENDING COUNTRIES: PERCEPTIONS, POLICIES AND TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS 3, 19 (Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen ed., 2003) (discussing dual citizenship policies in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia). For a
general discussion about why states may benefit from these ties and what strategies they
use to maintain them, see generally Symposium, A Tribute to the Work of Kim Barry: The
Construction of Citizenship in an Emigration Context, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2006).
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Moreover, permitting a naturalizing immigrant to retain her prior
citizenship lowers the cost of naturalization for the migrant because
she is not required to forfeit formal ties to her homeland that she
might value. This may spur increased naturalizations and generate
greater country-specific investments by migrants. 17 5 Of course, a
migrant's retention of her original citizenship could also undermine
her incentive to engage in country-specific investment because she
would be more likely to retain ties to the Sending State and to see the
1 76
option of returning there as valuable.
Whatever its ultimate effect on levels of country-specific investment over time, dual citizenship will afford the migrant more power to
prevent the Receiving State from making needed policy changes in
response to crises or changes in preferences of native citizens. If the
migrant remains loyal to the Sending State, and the crisis involves a
breakdown in the relationship between the two countries, the
migrant's citizenship-derived political power in the Receiving State
may be deeply unattractive for the native citizens of that country.
Seen in this way, dual citizenship appears as just another right
that-like basic rights, the right to remain, and participation rightscan be used to encourage migrants to enter and make country-specific
investments. But by the same token, dual citizenship can tie the hands
of the Receiving State and prevent it from modifying its demos if
177
events change.
Dual citizenship also has distinctive features. Unlike the other
rights, its value for the migrant (and hence for the Receiving State as a
precommitment device) is a function of the interests and diplomatic
power of the Sending State. The value of dual citizenship for the
migrant is high when two conditions are met: first, when the Sending
State is powerful enough that its diplomatic pressure on behalf of the
migrant will affect the policies of the Receiving State, and second,
when the Sending State has an interest in protecting its overseas
diaspora.
175 There is some evidence that traditionally restrictive countries like Sweden have
begun to allow dual citizenship in an effort to increase immigrant integration-that is, to
promote country-specific investments by migrants. Tanja Brondsted Sejersen, "I Vow to
Thee My Countries"--The Expansion of Dual Citizenship in the 21st Century, 42 INT'L
MIGRATION REv. 523, 535 (2008).
176 Compare Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY
L.J. 1411, 1468-69 (1997) (arguing that retention of former nationality will not slow assimilation), with SCHUCK, supra note 3, at 238 (questioning Spiro's claim and suggesting that
there is little evidence about effect of dual nationality on assimilation rates).
177 Cf Aleinikoff & Klusmeyer, supra note 170, at 77 (discussing some other reasons
why nation's openness to dual citizenship may turn on whether nation is interested in
immigration or emigration).
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The first factor is straightforward; the second is more complex.
Why would the Sending State have an interest in protecting its
emigrants? There are a number of interconnected answers: to reduce
population pressures, to obtain remittances, to establish links with
other countries, to meet a demand for employment opportunities
abroad, etc. None of these possible motives is necessarily clear, however. Consider the Sending State's interest in remittances. On the
one hand, by protecting emigrants, it encourages them to make
country-specific investments, which should lead to higher wages and
thus higher remittances. On the other hand, by protecting emigrants
and encouraging them to make country-specific investments, it may
cause them to become more deeply assimilated in the Receiving State,
and thus to lose their loyalty to the Sending State and the people who
live there, which would drive down remittances.
A number of propositions follow. One is that, all else equal,
countries with high internal demand for emigration will be more likely
to permit migrants to become dual citizens, and countries with high
demand for immigration will be more likely to permit migrants to
become dual citizens. But our main point is different and is taken
from our discussion of participation rights. The Receiving State will
be more likely to permit dual citizenship if it does not believe that the
Sending State will use diplomatic pressure to advance the interests of
migrants in a manner that injures the Receiving State. 178 As noted
above, the likelihood that the Sending State will do this depends both
on its interests and its power. The Receiving State need not worry
about a weak Sending State; it also need not worry if the Sending
State's migrant-derived interests do not differ much from the interests
of the Receiving State. This is most likely to be the case when the
migrants have political preferences that are similar to those of the
Receiving State's native citizens.
The possible interaction problems can be multiplied indefinitely.
We have already discussed how states might compete using childcitizenship rights. 179 Problems could also arise where conflicting
citizenship rules lead to children having no citizenship: for example, if
178 The flip side is that Sending States will be more likely to permit dual citizenship if
they believe their citizens will use their political influence in the Receiving State to benefit
the Sending State. There is some evidence that this motivation played a part in Mexico's
recent decision to permit emigrants naturalized abroad to retain their Mexican nationality.
Barry, supra note 174, at 46-47; see also Eva 0stergaard-Nielsen, The Politics of Migrants'
TransnationalPolitical Practices,37 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 760, 764-65 (2003) (describing,
in context of U.S.-Latin American relations, "attempts of sending country governments
and elites to coopt nationals abroad in an attempt to tap into their various economic and
political resources").
179 See Part III.B supra.
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the two parents are from different countries, each of which grants
citizenship rights only to children with two parents from that
country. 180 These problems-some of which are interesting, others of
which are simply confusing-are best left to future work.
C. Refugees and Asylum-Seekers
Interaction effects are also important for refugee law. Refugees
typically flee civil wars and other forms of political, religious, and
ethnic conflict. By offering to accept refugees, Receiving States grant
them exit options that are conditional on the domestic conflict
reaching a threshold level of severity.
From the perspective of refugees or potential refugees, the exit
option is of mixed value. On the one hand, the availability of refugee
status gives one the ability to escape a dangerous situation. On the
other hand, a person who is inclined to stay in her country of origin
and fight will find that others will leave rather than join the fight if
refugee status is available. Thus, liberal refugee laws will encourage
flight and might also increase the incentive for governments or other
groups to try to drive out populations that are not loyal to them,
including ethnic minorities.
In this fashion, the policies of the Receiving (asylum) State
interact with those of the Sending State. Nonetheless, despite the
potential theoretical costs of undermining resistance movements and
encouraging strategic behavior by governments in conflict-ridden
states, in practice the humanitarian costs of civil war and domestic
persecution are often too great for other countries to deny refugee
status.
But this leads to a second interaction effect-one between the
potential Receiving States. These states may all want refugees to have
an available place of asylum, but each state would prefer that the refugees be taken in by another state. Moreover, because the cost of refugee flows falls disproportionately on neighboring countries,'181 those
countries may threaten to deny entrance unless other countries either
accept a share of the refugee population or offer financial incentives.
Recognizing this collective action problem, countries have developed
various cooperation mechanisms, including treaties to address the
issue. 182
180 This citizenship coordination problem led to attempts during the twentieth century
to craft an international legal solution. E.g., 1930 Convention, supra note 173.
181 Neighboring countries often face the brunt of the burden simply because of proximity: Refugees fleeing conflict or persecution often flow over the closest available border.
182 For a discussion of how countries might better solve this collective action problem,
see Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Restructured Safe Havens: A Proposalfor Reform of the
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There is also the problem of distinguishing sincere refugees from
other migrants, such as economic migrants. Refugee status can be
quite valuable. While refugees in many countries are confined to
camps near the border of their home country, in countries like the
United States, refugees are given generous rights, including work permits and the ability to become LPRs and then citizens. 183 Consequently, much refugee law and policy is concerned with screening for
1 84
valid refugee claims and deterring invalid ones.
Where there are many potential asylum states, their screening
policies may interact. States with more stringent standards for asylum
are likely to attract more applicants with strong claims, because those
with weaker claims are less likely to satisfy the stringent standard.
Those with weaker claims will be more likely to seek asylum in states
with lower standards. This means that a state's optimal refugee
screening rules will depend on the rules in other potential Receiving
States. Without coordination, this interaction could lead to a race to
the bottom, in which all states adopt screening policies that are excessively stringent. 185 Only international cooperation of some sort can
solve this problem.

Refugee Protection System, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 44-56 (2000); James C. Hathaway & R.
Alexander Neve, Making InternationalRefugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposalfor Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 115, 201-09 (1997);
Peter H. Schuck, Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal,22 YALE J. INT'L L. 243,
251, 254-59 (1997).
183 See INA § 208(c)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(B) (2006) (requiring Attorney General to provide work authorization to successful asylum applicants); INA § 209(a)(1)(B), 8
U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1)(B) (permitting asylees to adjust their status to that of LPR after one
year).
184 To be sure, many states also attempt to deter claimants who can clearly establish
their status as refugees. This is in part because of the collective action problem identified
above: States would prefer that even valid refugees end up in some other state. The desire
to deter valid claimants is also driven by perceived capacity constraints. For example,
when faced with the mass influx of potential refugees from Cuba and Haiti, the United
States adopted interdiction policies and refugee-screening procedures that seemed deliberately designed to screen out high numbers of valid applicants. See Joyce A. Hughes, Flight
from Cuba, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 39, 58-64 (1999) (detailing policy shift to exclusion of
Cuban "balseros" in 1994).
185 See Ryan Bubb, Michael Kremer & David Levine, The Economics of International
Refugee Law 4-20 (Weatherhead Ctr. for Int'l Affairs, Working Paper No. 2008-0085,
2008), available at http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/node/2741 (providing model of race to
bottom in refugee policy); Jenny Monheim & Marie Obidzinski, Optimal Discretion in
Asylum Lawmaking 5-22 (BETA, Working Paper No. 2007-31, 2007), available at http://
econpapers.repec.org/paper/ulpsbbeta/2007-31.htm (proposing related model of refugee
policy).
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CONCLUSION

We have now offered two basic models that greatly simplify the
problem of optimal migration policy. In an earlier paper, we treated
the relationship between the Receiving State and the migrant as akin
to an employment relationship, where the migrant has private information about her "type" and the Receiving State must devise mechanisms for discovering that information. 18 6 In this paper, we treat the
relationship as a generic contractual relationship, where the Receiving
State seeks to attract entry and investment while retaining some flexibility and the migrant must decide whether to make country-specific
investments based on the Receiving State's migration policies.
For future work, we can see three possible directions. First, there
are other possible approaches to the basic migrant-Receiving State
relationship, and focus can be turned to other variables different from
the ones we have just touched on. For example, future work could
focus on the value of the migrant's exit option and the extent to which
that exit option limits the Receiving State's policy choices.
Second, there are numerous immigration rules that are of great
importance but whose incentive effects have received little attention.
For example, various rules limit the employment options of foreign
students, tourists, and spouses of migrants. These rules deserve more
attention.
Finally, the topic of "interaction effects" is of great importance
but also has received little attention. States compete and cooperate
with respect to migration in complex ways. What determines the conditions under which states grant dual citizenship? How does competition for migrants affect the determination of rights? Why is it that in
the past many states restricted the rights of native citizens to emigrate
and why is such restriction so rare today? Why do states offer different types of rights to people from different countries of origin? We
have suggested some angles from which to approach these questions,
but much work remains to be done before satisfactory answers can be
given.

186 Cox & Posner, supra note 10.
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